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Three Essays on Financial Information Disclosure 
 
Bo Zhang, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2017 
 
This thesis is comprised of three essays on informational issues that revolve around financial reporting, 
governance, and disclosure. The first essay focuses on how International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) adoption by the Canadian fund industry impacts the funds’ reported performance and managers’ 
behavior. When Canada implemented IFRS for publicly accountable enterprises (PAEs) in 2011, it received 
much attention from international researchers, professionals, and regulators mainly for three reasons: (1) 
IFRS were more mature when adopted in Canada as nine amendments had been made from 2005 through 
2010, and issues and uncertainties faced by earlier adopters such as firms from EU members may or may 
not exist in Canada; (2) pre-IFRS Canadian accounting standards were very close to that of the US, and 
thus, the Canadian experience has strong implication to the largest capital market which has not accepted 
IFRS as primary standards yet; (3) Canadian accounting and financial regulations have been shown to be 
more effective in controlling risks during the 2008 financial crisis compared to those of other major 
economies; how IFRS can strengthen such a tight system is to be examined and is important to IFRS 
proponents and standard setters. In 2014, Canada took the lead by being the first common law jurisdiction 
mandating IFRS for investment funds while most other countries hold up IFRS adoption in this particular 
industry due to various complications. This paper shows that IFRS adoption does affect the funds’ outcomes 
and managers’ behavior in Canadian closed-end investment funds, and voluntary disclosure of cash flows 
also strongly affects fund managers’ return and valuation discretion. The implication is that if a country is 
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not ready to fully implement IFRS in the fund industry because of complications at the accounting and 
financial levels, mandatory disclosure of cash flows could lead to better accounting quality as well, since 
one major difference between IFRS and GAAP is the disclosure of cash flows which constrains manager’s 
discretion on asset appraisals.  
The second essay studies the implications from outside directors’ turnover. Outside directors have been 
extensively studied as a governance factor, but their behaviors are not well documented in the literature, 
partly because most agency theory-based research concentrates on the behavior of managers, not that of 
directors. While the majority of studies in the governance literature analyze characteristics of directors in a 
static way, I look at this question in a dynamic way which considers directors’ behaviors. This paper studies 
S&P 500 companies that have boardroom turnovers due to outside directors’ unexpected departures. The 
departures of these non-executive directors usually do not trigger investors’ concerns. However, our results 
show that when they do not provide concrete reasons, the firms from which they resigned experience 
underperformance afterward. This result suggests that directors may have resigned ahead of sub 
performance because of information they became privy to. The implication is strong to both regulators and 
investors. While governance regulations require a certain proportion of outside directors on compensation 
and audit committees with the intention of achieving efficient governance and releasing timely and reliable 
information, such mechanisms are substantially affected if outside directors do not fulfill their 
responsibilities when firms face challenges. Investors who take long positions should be alerted about 
outside directors’ unexplained departure, and investors who take short positions may find opportunities 
when a company has boardroom turnover. 
The third essay examines a financial question around mergers and acquisitions announcements. In a tender 
offer, the bidder contacts shareholders of a target firm directly by announcing a public offer to tender their 
shares. The risk arises because the acquisition may or may not go through. Insiders typically have a better 
appreciation of the likelihood of a successful acquisition than outsiders, who have very limited access to 
strategic and private information. As a result, outsiders are at the disadvantageous position during mergers 
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and acquisitions. This paper documents that besides official and public releases, outsiders can also rely on 
stock returns around announcements to infer private information to reduce information asymmetry. While 
current regulations and reporting standards do not have effective ways to minimize information asymmetry 
during mergers and acquisitions, this study highlights an avenue that indirectly mitigates outsiders’ 
information disadvantage. 
Keywords: IFRS, return management, closed-end funds, outside directors, future performance, mergers 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Information content and disclosure quality are the core of financial reporting systems. Professional 
accounting bodies, researchers, and regulators globally have been seeking better reporting quality and 
striving to reduce information asymmetry by various ways such as stronger professional codes, theoretical 
and archival studies, amendments, new regulations, and tighter laws. So far, regulatory changes have been 
one of the most extensively studied areas in the literature, and regulations aiming to enhance governance 
and enhanced information disclosure are also widely discussed by accounting scholars. However, some 
gaps do exist in the literature. For instance, IFRS adoption in the Canadian investment fund industry is one 
of the new regulatory changes which has not been studied so far, despite the fact that it has implications 
beyond Canada’s borders since the investment fund industry is global but has yet to adopt IFRS in almost 
all countries. 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was formed in 1973 through an agreement 
among professional accounting bodies from the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Germany, the USA, 
Canada, Mexico, Australia, and Japan. In 1997, the IASC saw a need to bring about convergence between 
domestic accounting standards and global accounting standards and the IASC’s governance was completely 
overhauled.  This paved the way for the creation of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
in 2001 for the purpose of having a global set of accounting standards. With the efforts by the IASB and 
global regulatory bodies, more than 100 countries currently require or permit companies to comply with 
IASB standards which are International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (De Georege, Li, and 
Shivakumar [2016]). The implementation of IFRS is one of the major efforts made by professionals, 
academia, and regulators jointly since the new millennium, and the impact and implications of IFRS have 
been the focus of academic interest for about two decades since the voluntary adoption of IFRS in major 
economies. While public accountable enterprises have been embracing IFRS in a voluntary manner for two 
decades and a mandatory status for one decade, investment funds remained exempt from IFRS adoption in 
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most countries. Currently, full adoption of IFRS is not widespread as only Canada and four EU members 
require IFRS for their investment fund industries. 
One major difference between IFRS and Canadian GAAP with respect to investment funds is the mandatory 
disclosure of cash flows, which is optional under Canadian GAAP and other local standards. IAS 7, 
Statement of Cash Flows, sets out the requirements for presenting such financial information without 
exemption. While the debate on IFRS adoption has not reached a single conclusion because of various 
factors that could lead to either more accurate valuation or more discretional appraisals, the investment fund 
industry rules out many of the competing factors by its relative simplicity of financial reports compared to 
other financial institutions and public firms. Moreover, IFRS adoption is usually accompanied by other 
regulatory reforms (Daske et al. [2008]; Kim, Liu, and Zheng [2012]; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2013]; 
Florou and Kosi [2015]) and it is not clear if the outcome results from accounting standards or other reforms, 
but the Canadian regulator implemented a two-stage adoption for publicly accountable enterprises in the 
first stage and investment funds in the second stage. As a result, the fund industry is affected purely by 
IFRS adoption as other institutional changed have been completed during the first stage when public firms 
were affected. For instance, the Canadian Auditing Standards (CAS) that comply with the International 
Standards on Auditing became effective since December 14, 2010. The new CAS establish new requirement 
on the risk assessment, internal control, and board’s participation in auditor’ report.  In the same year, the 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) established a dedicated Corporate Governance 
Division to oversee the governance practice of Canadian financial institutions and ensure the compliance 
with OSFI’s Corporate Governance Guidelines. These two regulatory reforms accompanied the adoption 
of IFRS and led to combined outcomes of financial reporting in Canada. However, when the Canadian 
investment fund industry welcomed IFRS, no other major regulatory changes that can affect accounting 
quality were made simultaneously in Canada. This unique setting makes Canadian fund industry ideal for 
the study of IFRS impact. In this paper, I employ Canadian closed-end fund and study the return and 
valuation management of these financial entities before and after IFRS adoption. Results show that IFRS, 
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in general, reduce return management, but voluntary disclosure of cash flows before mandatory requirement 
by IFRS also play an important role in limiting manager’s discretional valuations. While this paper 
contributes to the existing IFRS literature by studying the investment fund industry under the international 
accounting system, it also has implications for regulators that are not ready to mandate IFRS for their local 
investment funds. Without having to implement IFRS fully, a regulatory body can simply mandate the 
disclosure of cash flows as an effective way to constrain managers’ discretionary appraisal of assets values: 
this paper reports that the disclosure of cash flows is a significant factor reducing discretion in the fund 
industry. This paper also contributes to the literature by being one of the first studies linking IFRS adoption 
with Net asset value (NAV) discount: investments measured at Fair Value Level 2 exhibit greater 
association with NAV discount in Canadian investment funds after the adoption of IFRS.  
Besides accounting standards changes, regulatory bodies and lawmakers have also pushed for stronger 
governance and better reporting quality as ways to lower information asymmetry. Following the financial 
scandals of the past two decades, regulations such as the SOX set more definite requirement for the presence 
of outside directors to oversee manager’s opportunistic behavior. However, outside directors also have their 
opportunistic behaviors, but regulations seem limited and inefficient in reducing directors’ opportunistic 
behaviors. The second essay examines the turnover of outside directors in S&P 500 firms. Results show 
that when firms are likely to underperform, many outside directors choose to leave the company with an 
excuse or without any explanation. When firms face potential troubles, outside directors are supposed, by 
both regulators and investors, to perform two major tasks: first, overseeing the manager to prevent any 
untimely disclosure of information or intentional distort of information; second, working with other board 
members and management to solve the problem that may exist or arise. However, many outside directors 
appear to shirk their responsibility and evade being associated with underperforming companies. Such 
behavior substantially reduces governance efficiency and potentially affects reporting quality. While most 
studies focus on manager’s behavior and believe that governance factors such as the presence of outside 
directors reduces manager’s opportunistic behavior, this study looks from a different perspective and warns 
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regulators and investors that outside directors are also subject to opportunistic behavior and that oversight 
and regulation on outside directors should also be established or reinforced. Otherwise, governance failure 
may occur when governance is most needed. 
Besides the routine financial reports, there are several circumstances that regulated disclosures do not 
provide timely and sufficient information. In the United States, in situations of mergers and acquisitions, 
bidders are required by the Williams Act to file schedule TO with the SEC, but the outcome of the offer 
relies heavily on private information which is not reflected in public filings. Since disclosure regulations 
have a very limited effect on reducing information asymmetry during acquisitions, outsiders and small 
investors are at a severe information disadvantage during such corporate activities. With the given 
regulatory reality, this paper examines if outsiders can rely on alternative public information to infer what 
they do not have access to. By examining abnormal returns around tender announcements and offer closures, 
this study presents evidence that insider information is reflected in abnormal returns and outside investors 
can capture such inferred information to mitigate their disadvantageous position. Since disclosure 
regulations have not required effective ways to reduce information asymmetry during tender offer periods, 
I suggest that outside investors use indirect ways to obtain information and protect themselves. 
To summarize, this dissertation as a whole raise and answers the following questions. 
1. When accounting standards change, how is reporting quality affected? More specifically, when IFRS 
replace GAAP as the reporting standards, how is the investment fund industry impacted regarding its return 
management and asset valuation? 
2. While a governance mechanism is supposed to mitigate agency problem and prevent manager’s 
opportunistic behaviors, what if a governance mechanism can also be subject to opportunistic behavior? If 
this opportunistic behavior happens in a governance mechanism, what are the consequences and how can 
investors detect governance ineffectiveness? 
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3. In practice, disclosure cannot be complete and thorough. When disclosure is limited, what are other 
sources of information and how can investors at an information disadvantage reduce their information gap? 
This dissertation provides evidence that IFRS adoption reduces return management in Canadian closed-end 
funds, and voluntary disclosure of cash flows also contributes to less return management. NAV discount is 
also affected by IFRS adoption, and Level 2 assets contribute to a larger proportion of NAV discount as 
discretion in the valuation of Level 3 assets is more constrained under IFRS. While the presence and work 
of outside directors improve governance quality, in a dynamic context outside directors may shirk their 
responsibilities by quitting a firm that has potential troubles. Such behavior exacerbates a company’s 
situation by impairing governance efficiency when the company and investors need it. Finally, during 
mergers and acquisitions when disclosure is limited, outside investors can infer private information by 
analyzing stock returns around offer announcement so as to achieve better information position. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents Essay I which investigates the implication and 
impact of IFRS adoption in Canadian closed-end funds. Chapter 3 presents Essay II which analyzes a 
governance issue caused by outside directors shirking their responsibilities when firms are potentially in 
trouble. Chapter 4 presents Essay III which discusses the information asymmetry and inferred private 
information during tender offer for mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and discuss 





Chapter 2   
 
Discretion in Assets Valuation in Canadian Investment Funds after 




Since 2011, Canadian publicly accountable enterprises have been required to use International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, this requirement did not apply to investment funds until 2014. 
Among the earliest adopters of IFRS for the fund industry, Canada is a developed market and has 
institutional factors that resemble many other major capital markets. This study examines the pre-IFRS and 
post-IFRS assets appraisals by Canadian investment funds to assess if the adoption of IFRS leads fund 
managers to engage in more or less return management. Results show that after the adoption of IFRS the 
discretionary part of the unrealized gain is more aligned with its non-discretionary part, indicating reduced 
valuation and return management on assets which valuation is more discretionary, i.e., assets which are 
measured at fair value Level 2 and Level 3. This paper also finds that voluntary disclosure of Cash Flows 
before IFRS adoption has a significant constraining impact on valuation and return management. Moreover, 
while prior research documents that NAV discount is more associated with Level 3 assets than it is with 








Since the adoption of IFRS in the European Union (EU) on January 1st, 2005, much attention has been 
given to the implications and consequences of IFRS for publicly accountable firms. IFRS now have been 
implemented in more than 100 countries around the world, but most regulators globally hold up their 
applications arising from the consolidation of investments in firms controlled by funds. Hence, in most 
countries, the investment fund industry keeps reporting under domestic Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), and how IFRS impact the fund industry remains an unanswered question due to the 
lack of empirical facts. However, Canada’s Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) took a step ahead by 
requiring Canadian investment funds, including mutual fund companies, EFT, and hedge fund providers, 
following IFRS starting January 2014. Canada’s adoption of IFRS for investment funds thus provides a 
unique opportunity to assess if and how IFRS affect the quality of valuation figures reported by those funds. 
The question being addressed in this paper is whether IFRS adoption in the Canadian fund industry reduces 
fund managers’ discretion on fund returns and asset valuation. Similar to the concept of earnings 
management, it is possible for fund managers to manage the valuation of assets to smooth the reported 
performance of investment funds for their individual benefits. Investment funds typically hold financial 
assets that are reported at fair value. While the valuation of actively traded securities is constrained by 
public information, the valuation of unquoted securities is subject to some discretion. Therefore, the 
discretionary component in the valuation of financial assets measured at Level 2 or 3, more or less 
determines the accounting of reported returns. In this regard, prior research documents that investment 
funds are, like publicly traded firms, subject to manager’s opportunistic behavior due to individual 
incentives (Nissim 2003).  
One key change brought forward with IFRS adoption is that the statement of Cash Flows became mandatory. 
Moreover, net assets attributable to holders of redeemable shares are classified as equity under GAAP, 
whereas net assets attributable to holders of redeemable shares are classified as liability under IFRS. While 
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both IFRS and GAAP require funds to value assets at fair value, there is a minor difference between the 
two standards: instruments classified as equity of the entity are carried at cost under GAAP, but such 
instruments are carried at redemption value under IFRS, and changes in this redemption value should be 
recorded through the income statement. IFRS 7 requires investment funds to disclose the concentrations of 
risk quantitatively through the Schedule of Investments, but GAAP do not specify the disclosure of such 
detail. IFRS also require details such as the portion of the profit and loss attributable to the minority interest 
to be disclosed separately in the income statement. The amendment on Investment Entities issued in 2012 
converges one major difference between IFRS and GAAP regarding consolidation of controlled investees. 
The new standard, effective from January 1, 2014, requires investment funds to only measure investees at 
fair value, which is the same method under GAAP. In general, IFRS require greater disclosure compared 
to GAAP.  
Using a sample of Canadian closed-end investment funds from 2012 to 2017, this study compares the pre- 
and post-IFRS reported book returns. Results are to the effect, in general, that the reported performance of 
securities which fair value measurement is more discretionary (Level 2 and Level 3) to be more aligned 
with the reported performance of securities which fair value measurement is non-discretionary (Level 1) 
after the implementation of IFRS. Such increased alignment suggests that due to the enhanced disclosure 
and additional constraints, the fair value of Level 2 and Level 3 assets in closed-end investment funds 
reflects more faithfully the underlying performance of the securities under IFRS than under GAAP. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it is one of the few empirical 
studies on how IFRS impact the reporting quality and managerial behavior in investment funds. Because 
regulatory bodies around the world are conservative on implementing IFRS in the investment fund industry, 
even the earliest IFRS-adopting economies have not mandatorily required IFRS for investment funds. 
However, Canada had decided to be ahead of its peers starting January 1st 2014, and it is now possible to 
employ Canadian data for an archival research to examine how IFRS impact fund industry which has not 
been included in prior IFRS literature. Although there are studies examining how the adoption of IFRS 
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attracts foreign mutual funds (DeFond, Hu, and Li [2011]; Shima and Gorden [2011]; Florou and Pope 
[2012]), investment funds as reporting entities have not been studied in the extant literature. This paper 
contributes to the literature by examining the implication of IFRS to investment funds’ financial reporting 
outcomes, and evidence of this paper supports the argument that IFRS reduce fund manager’s discretionary 
valuation of investment securities. Second, besides IFRS themselves, this study also sheds some light on 
disclosure questions such as if increased disclosure effectively constrains managers’ opportunistic behavior. 
In the Canadian context, domestic GAAP had not required disclosure of cash flows on a mandatory basis. 
Since the adoption of IFRS, Canadian funds began to disclose cash flows and, thus, the information content 
of their financial reports has increased. This particular setting broadens the implication from the study in 
the sense that for countries not ready to adopt IFRS for the fund industry, consideration could be given to 
the mandatory disclosure of cash flows for increased reliability and relevance. Third, this study also brings 
new elements into the stream of studies on Net Asset Value (NAV) discount which has not been linked 
with IFRS and disclosure level. By comparing the pre- and post-IFRS NAV discount in Canadian closed-
end funds, it is observed that the NAV discount is highly associated with the unrealized gain on Level 3 
assets which is consistent with several recent papers. Fourth, IFRS studies usually combine the effect of 
other changes in the reporting infrastructure (Daske et al. [2008]; Kim, Liu, and Zheng [2012]; Christensen, 
Hail, and Leuz [2013]; Florou and Kosi [2015]), leading to both challenge and opportunities for future 
research (Leuz and Wysochi, 2016). The Canadian setting of two-stage implementation separates the 
institutional changes from the second stage when IFRS was adopted in the fund industry. This unique setting 
resolves the challenge brought up by Leuz and Wysochi (2016) that “IFRS were often adopted amidst a 
series of other institutional reforms, making it difficult to identify the effects of IFRS adoption separately 
from other concurrent institutional changes”. While all the institutional reforms have been completed at 
the first stage when IFRS was adopted among Canadian public firms, the transition in fund industry is only 
affected by IFRS standards itself as other institutional changes have been completed by 2011. This setting 
ideally matches the research context visualized by Leuz and Wysochi (2016) that “rules could be 
implemented in a staggered fashion.” 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 reviews the institutional background of 
IFRS, Canadian setting, and practice of the closed-end funds. Section 2.4 reviews the literature pertaining 
to IFRS and closed-end funds. Section 2.5 describes the hypothesis and research design. Section 2.6 
presents the sample selection and summary of data. Section 2.7 presents the results and Section 2.8 
concludes the findings of this study. 
 
2.3 IFRS and Institutional background in Canada 
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and its predecessor the International Standards 
Committee (IASC), have been developing a set of accounting standards with the purpose of international 
application since 1971 (De George, Li, and Shivakumar [2016]). A major impetus for the dissemination of 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was their adoption by the European Union in 2002, 
with implementation in 2005. IFRS adoption is associated with two main objectives: (1) increased reporting 
quality and (2) improved cross-country comparability. Hence, since January 1, 2005, prominent capital 
markets outside North American such as London, Paris, and Frankfurt began to require publicly traded 
firms to present financial statements in conformity with IFRS, while voluntary adoption of IFRS was 
permitted before 2005. Other major markets introduced IFRS into their regimes in the subsequent years, 
such as China in 2007 (Chinese GAAP is broadly in line with IFRS), Japan in 2010, Canada in 2011, India 
2015, and Singapore in 2018.  
For the application of IFRS to investment funds, the IASB recognized a potentially significant accounting 
issue regarding the consolidation of controlled entities and made revisions in 2012 to largely resolve this 
issue. Consolidation has always been an issue for private equity funds as most professionals do not consider 
it meaningful. Investment funds invest only for the purposes of income and capital appreciation, and 
accessing the investee’s assets and debts are not the purposes of this type of entity. Therefore a detailed 
consolidation representing the underlying assets and liabilities of their investments would not be a 
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reasonable and relevant presentation of the investment funds’ financial position. Investors would also face 
complex information to judge the value of investment funds. The Investment Entities amendments 
(amendments to IFRS 10, Consolidated Financial Statements; IFRS 12, Disclosure of Interests in Other 
Entities; and IAS 27, Separate Financial Statements on Investment Entities) released in 2012 provide an 
exception to the consolidation requirements in IFRS 10 and require investment entities to measure particular 
subsidiaries at fair value through profit or loss, rather than consolidate them. In 2013, the Canadian 
Accounting Standard Board (AcSB) and Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) adopted these 
amendments and required investment funds to apply IFRS for financial years beginning on or after January 
2014, which is three years deferred from 2011 when IFRS began to be effective for all other Canadian 
publicly accountable enterprises. The deferral of the mandatory changeover to January 1, 2014 is intended 
to allow the IASB’s proposed exemption from consolidation for investment entities to be in place prior to 
the adoption of IFRS by investment companies in Canada. 
Before 2004, one of the Canadian Accounting Standard Board’s (AcSB) primary objectives was to 
eliminate or minimize differences between Canadian GAAP and US GAAP, and its primary focus was to 
harmonize Canadian GAAP with U.S. GAAP (AcSB 2004). Canadian economy has long been strongly tied 
to the US market, as “Over 80% of its exports being US-bound, and over 60% of its foreign equity portfolio 
investment coming from the United States”(Ramanna 2013), and Canadian accounting rules thus became 
detailed like the US rules before IFRS adoption (Milburn and Skinner [2001]; Chlala and Fortin [2005]; 
Blanchette et al. [2011]).  However, Canada’s US-converging objective lost its focus on May 31, 2004, 
when the AcSB sought comment as to whether Canada would be better off adopting IFRS, US GAAP, or 
keeping Canadian GAAP. After a year of consideration, on February 10th, 2005, the AcSB proposed 
adopting IFRS to the Accounting Standards Oversight Council, and on March 31st, 2005, the AsSB sought 
only comment on IFRS adoption, not considering US GAAP anymore. The AcSB formally adopted IFRS 
in 2006, with full-fledged implementation to start in January 2011 onwards, thus providing a five-year 
transition period for a larger scope of investors globally and provide better access to international capital, 
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funding, and investment opportunities. Burnett et al. (2015) show evidence confirming that Canadian firms 
prefer IFRS when operating in more globalized industry or regions with less US presence. “It has become 
increasingly difficult to make foreign investors comfortable, in the sense of understanding, the Canadian 
accounting system that we have in place. It is very expensive to educate others. The choices are simple: it’s 
either US GAAP or international standards” (Paul Cherry [2006]). Although Canada’s economic reliance 
on the US remained overwhelming, its dependence on the United States had been decreasing in recent years 
largely due to growing commerce and investment flows with and from the EU and China (Ramanna [2013]), 
where IFRS have either been adopted or received the commitment of convergence. Burnett et al. (2015) 
document that Canadian firms are more willing to report under IFRS when they have less US shareholders, 
although AcSB noticed “a generally lower level of satisfaction” about IFRS in 2014. 
While IFRS have been adopted or pledged to be adopted with full conformity in approximated 100 reporting 
jurisdictions, only five countries do not exempt investment funds from such conformity. Croatia, Cyprus, 
Malta, and Turkey have mandated the use of IFRS in the fund industry since 2005. The reticence to adopt 
IFRS for investment funds by most adopting countries led the IASB to recognize a potentially significant 
accounting issue for investment funds. Accordingly, it made revisions in 2012 to resolve this issue. To 
accommodate the timing of the IASB revisions, the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) issued 
a deferral of the mandatory IFRS transition for investment funds. The Canadian Securities Administrators 
(CSA) finally required Canadian investment funds must report in accordance with IFRS beginning on or 
after January 1, 2014. Hence, Canada has been the first common-law regime (La Porta et al. 1998) 
mandating IFRS for investment funds, and this legal setting is crucial for international regulators looking 
for empirical evidence, as legal origin and country-level governance are key determinants of accounting 
outcomes (Ball et al. 2000; Burnet et al. 2015; Bonetti, Magnan, and Parbonetti, 2016). The Canadian 
experience has particularly high applicability to other major capital markets such as those in the US, the 
UK, Hong Kong, Singapore as they are classified into the British-American system (Hung [2000]). For 
instance, Canadian GAAP generate no difference in reporting quality compared to the US GAAP (Webster 
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and Thornton [2005]), showing that Canadian experience with regard to accounting standards is more likely 
to carry over to a US setting because of two countries’ same legal origin and converged accounting and 
auditing practices. 
The impact of the changeover from GAAP to IFRS in Canada may not be as large as in other jurisdictions. 
First, Canadian GAAP are considered principles-based as opposed to rules-based (Webster and Thornton 
[2005]), although they also contain a certain level of detailed rules (Chlala and Fortin [2005]). Second, for 
the fund industry in particular, the difference could be even smaller. Canadian GAAP have adapted to the 
Canadian reality that a large proportion of Canadian listed firms are in the mining and natural resources 
industry (Blanchette and Desfleurs [2011]) as “ 57% of the global mining financings were done on TSX and 
TSXV in 2016” (TSX publication [2017]), whereas IFRS aimed for global adoption does not have as many 
special considerations. However, Canadian GAAP has not particularly made adaption for the fund industry 
so that the transition to IFRS is not associated with changes as great as that in public firms. Nevertheless, 
IFRS generally require more disclosure than Canadian GAAP (Deloitte [2009]), and in the case of the 
Canadian fund industry, IAS 1 clearly mandates, without exemption, the disclosure of cash flows which 
was voluntary under Canadian GAAP. Although Canadian GAAP have its similarities with IFRS at a 
conceptual level, this increased disclosure accentuates the difference between Canadian GAAP and IFRS 
which are both principles-based though. Moreover, reporting entities face increased competition for capital 
in domestic markets (Tan et al. 2011; DeFond et al. [2011]) after the adoption of IFRS because of enhanced 
cross-country comparison. As a result, managers have higher incentives to increase the level if not the 
quality of information contained in financial reports (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi [2009]; Gordon et al. 
[2012]). These combined effects translate into greater information content among investment funds after 
the transition to IFRS. 
2.4 Literature Review 
 




Being the world’s largest capital market, there is much academic interest in the US regulatory and 
accounting changes, with each US change being studied extensively (Leuz and Wysocki [2016]). However, 
other countries have received increased attention during the IFRS adoption process. The introduction of 
IFRS provided an unprecedented experiment to study the consequences of changing an accounting standard 
setting and how these consequences vary across institutional and legal regimes (De George, Li, and 
Shivakumar [2016]; Leuz and Wysocki [2016]). Since the governance of IASB was overhauled, IFRS have 
been applied in the European Union and other prominent capital markets such as Hong Kong, Brazil, and 
Australia. The debates over IFRS initially started from conjectural statements due to lack of data (Schipper 
[2003]; Ball [2006]) but expanded to a larger body of competing empirical results. Soderstrom and Sun 
(2007) and Pope and McLeay (2011) review the empirical IFRS studies and discuss the implementation of 
IFRS in the EU. Empirical evidence supports the view that the events associated with the adoption of IFRS 
improve the information environment by reducing information asymmetry and improving comparability of 
ﬁnancial statements (Byard, Li, and Yu [2011], DeFond et al. [2011], Tan, Wang,and Welker [2011], 
Horton, Serafeim, and Serafeim [2013]) 
Barth et al. (2008) explain why IFRS could improve accounting quality. First, IFRS eliminate certain 
accounting alternatives which might be selected by managers for discretionary purposes (Ashbaugh and 
Pincus [2001]). Second, principle-based IFRS reduce managers’ opportunity to play with standards (Ewert 
and Wagenhofer [2005]). Third, IFRS permit measurements that better reflect economic values of assets. 
For these reasons, Barth et al. (2008) find evidence that is consistent with IFRS-adopting firms showing an 
improvement in accounting quality between the pre- and post-adoption periods. In contrast, Ahmed et al. 
(2013) show evidence that among countries with strong legal enforcement, post-IFRS accounting quality 
is lower. Ahmed et al. (2013) employ non-IFRS benchmark countries which include Canada as strong legal 
enforcement, and after Canada became an IFRS adopter, Liu and Sun (2015) find no significant evidence 
that post-IFRS accounting quality is higher than pre-IFRS accounting quality, echoing with Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) who find no change in earnings management after IFRS adoption in Australia and UK, 
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countries that have legal enforcement regimes similar to Canada. Aussenegg, Inwinkl, and Schneider (2008) 
find that the adoption of IFRS has no impact on earnings management in Ireland which is also of British 
legal origin. 
Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) go beyond the usual analysis of reported financial numbers and extend 
the IFRS literature to encompass qualitative disclosures in financial reports. They find that IFRS reports 
tend to be significantly longer and contain less boilerplate language than non-IFRS annual reports. Based 
on these results, they conclude that mandatory IFRS adoption has also increased the quality of textual 
disclosures. 
2.4.2 Reporting incentive literature 
 
The extant literature (Fan and Wong [2002]; Ball, Robin, and Wu [2003]; Leuz et al. [2003]; Leuz, Nanda, 
and Wysocki [2003]; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz [2006]; Barth et al. [2008]; Hail and Leuz [2009]; Ahmed, 
Neel, and Wang [2013]; Hansen, Pownall, Prakash, and Vulcheva [2013]; Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 
[2013]) document that reporting incentives play a significant role in reporting outcomes. In Canada, there 
are funds voluntarily disclosing cash flows before being required by IFRS. Funds that did voluntarily 
disclose cash flows prior to IFRS adoption express their incentives to provide more information and be 
transparent, and this incentive factor may have implication to and impact on the reporting outcome after 
the transition to IFRS. Accounting standards, principles-based or rules-based, give managers a certain 
extent of discretion because the application of standards and choice of methods involve considerable 
judgment. As a result, managers are able to hide information to avoid debt covenant violations (Watts and 
Zimmerman [1986]), distort information to meet earnings goal (Cohen et al. [2008]), or produce a more 
informative report to reflect better performance (Tucker and Zarowin [2006]). The subjective judgment 
means that under the same reporting standards, entities with different incentives may present financial 
outcomes of different quality. This difference of incentive could be bi-dimensional: (1) unconditional 
incentives: firms that consistently produce more informative financial reports due to certain governance 
and industry factors; (2) conditional incentives: firms that produce more or less informative financial reports 
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in response to the performance or financial needs of that fiscal year. Therefore, how IFRS shape firms’ 
reporting quality may differ according to many firm-level variables (Ball et al. [2003]; Ball and Shivakumar 
[2005]; Burgstahler et al. [2006]; Lang et al. [2006]). However, if firm-level factors have not changed after 
IFRS, the new standards may not have a significant impact (Ball [2006]; Soderstrom and Sun [2007]; Hail 
et al. [2010]; Bruggemann et al. [2012]). Taking into account the incentives at the firm level, Daske et al. 
(2013) classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters of IFRS, showing evidence that reporting outcomes 
diverge with different incentives.  
2.4.3 Closed-end fund and return management 
 
Fund managers’ compensation is also linked to relative performance (Brown et al. [1996]; Kempf et al. 
[2009]), and they have the same incentive to report maximized performance. Chandar and Bricker (2002) 
argue that “closed-end funds are eminently suited for studying earnings management, particularly because 
the assessments of both managerial incentives and valuation discretion are far clearer and simpler than in 
operating companies.” Pontiff (1995) states that “closed-end funds are the simplest of corporations.” 
Lawrence, Siriviriyakul, and Sloan (2015) set forth the advantage of closed-end funds as a research subject 
that “we can directly observe both the market prices and the fair values for the same underlying portfolio 
of assets.” Bollen and Pool (2009) document that hedge fund managers distort reported earnings “when 
fund returns are at their discretion and when their reported returns are not closely monitored.” Cassar and 
Gerakos (2011) document that hedge fund managers intentionally smooth self-reported returns. Patton, 
Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2015) find that underperforming hedge funds routinely revise earlier reported 
earnings, whereas outperforming hedge funds do not revise this number. Many of the fund-related earnings 
studies are based on hedge funds, partly because hedge funds report returns in a more frequent manner. 
However, managers in other types of investment funds also have the ability to manipulate reported earnings 
and returns. For example, Cici, Gibson, and Merrick (2011) find that the fair value of the same bond is 
estimated differently across different mutual funds, and the marking patterns are related with managers’ 
return-smoothing behavior. Together, all these papers suggest that earnings management exists in the fund 
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industry as it does in listed companies. Nevertheless, to study earnings management in depth, we typically 
need cash flow numbers that have just been required for Canadian investment funds. The question did not 
have available data to be examined before and elsewhere. IFRS requires funds to report the statement of 
cash flow which provides necessary information that earnings management studies need. Therefore, the 
Canadian context provides a great setting to look at the impact of IFRS on the earnings management 
behavior among investment funds. In summary, earnings management in the investment fund industry 
which has not been studied can now receive some attention through the Canadian setting.  
2.4.4 NAV discount and IFRS 
 
Closed-end funds are unique in that they do not continuously sell or redeem shares with investors. Instead, 
they engage in an initial public offering, after which their shares trade on a stock exchange at the prevailing 
market price. Fund boards are required by regulations (e.g., the Investment Company Act in the US and the 
National Instruments NI 81-102 in Canada) to determine the fair values of their underlying investments and 
to use these fair values to compute the fund’s net asset value per share (NAV). Thus, a closed-end fund has 
both a market-determined share price and an accounting-determined NAV that is based on the estimated 
fair value of its security holdings. The premium (discount) of the fund is the resulting difference between 
the share price and the NAV. It has long been established in the finance literature that closed-end funds 
frequently trade at premiums or discounts. The difference between NAV and unit price is referred as a 
“puzzle” by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and by the extant literature for the reason that the causes of 
NAV discount have not been fully explained. This puzzle has been the subject of significant attention from 
both academics and professionals. One stream of study tries to explain the discount with more concentration 
on the nature of closed-end funds. Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) theoretically sort out four categories: 
(1) Biases in NAV; (2) Agency costs; (3) Tax timing; and (4) Market segmentation. Berk and Stanton (2007) 
argue that investors discount fund assets if manager’s ability turns out to be less than expected. They also 
infer that when manager’s ability turns out to be better than expected, the increasing demand for 
compensation will eventually cause the premium to revert to a discount. The other stream of studies explains 
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the NAV discount by the imperfect reliability of accounting and factors that lead to reduced reliability. 
Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) show the correlation between NAV discount and agency efficiency 
such as compensation sensitivity to performance. Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993), Khorana, Wahal, 
and Zenner (2002), and Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2002) also report evidence of relations between 
fund discounts and agency problems. Johnson, Lin, and Song (2006) document that NAV discount is 
reduced among funds with minimum dividend payout policy, which signals lower agency cost (Ross [1977]; 
Bhattacharya [1979]; John and Williams [1985]). Cherkes, Sagi, and Wang (2015) corroborate this theory 
with empirical evidence that dividend commitment contributes to fund’s wealth transferring from 
manager’s control to shareholders’ claim. Accounting reliability also matters as discounts are more 
pronounced for Level 2 and Level 3 measurements than for Level 1 measurements (Cullinan and Zheng 
[2013]; Hammami [2014]). 
Investment funds hold primarily financial assets that are being measured and reported at fair values, and 
the concept of value relevance in accounting directly corresponds to the association between NAV and unit 
price. Aharony, Barniv, and Falk (2010) examine the impact of IFRS adoption on value relevance in 
European countries, and they find that IFRS adoption has increased the value relevance of asset revaluation. 
Landsman et al. (2012) examine the market reactions to earnings announcement and show that information 
content of released earnings is increased after IFRS adoption. Agostino, Drago, and Silipo (2011) also find 
that IFRS adoption has improved the value relevance of earnings and book value with a sample of European 
banks. Barth et al. (2014) document that value relevance after IFRS has increased for financial firms which 
hold primarily investment securities as investment funds do. As for the Canadian context, Cormier and 
Magnan (2014) document that IFRS enhance the value relevance of earnings in publicly accountable firms. 
Khan, Anderson, Warsame, and Wright (2015) also document improved value relevance of TSX firms after 
IFRS adoption, as exhibited by greater return volatility and trading volumes during the announcement 
period. Now that accounting values are more relevant to the determination of stock prices, the difference 
between NAV and unit price should reflect this increased relevance. 
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Nellessen and Zuelch (2011) study property companies which hold primarily real estate that is reported at 
fair value although such assets are not financial instruments like that held by investment funds. In this 
setting, they are the first to link NAV discount with IFRS adoption. They employ a sample of 76 European 
property companies over the 2005-2007 period to present a negative correlation between NAV discount 
and the reliability of fair value which were adopted after IFRS. In other words, when properties are 
appraised by external entities, which proxy for higher reliability of fair value, the NAV discount is smaller. 
Nellessen and Zuelch (2011) do not compare between pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods, as property 
companies did not report real estate at fair value under GAAP. Therefore, the Canadian setting is unique 
and the first to provide archival data for a comparison between the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods with 
regard to how NAV is impacted by IFRS adoption, because (1) the Canadian fund industry, ahead of 
investment funds in other reporting regimes, has adopted IFRS; (2) the fund industry holds financial assets 
that have been reported at fair value pre-IFRS, meaning that in this industry valuation is comparable before 
and after IFRS adoption, whereas European properties companies do not provide such a comparable setting. 
Jurek and Stafford (2015) argue that managerial discretion contributes to the magnitude of the NAV. Cao 
et al. (2013) document that managerial discretion in NAV is associated with fund returns, while Bollen and 
Pool (2008) document that managerial discretion in NAV is conditional on fund performance. Considering 
the evidence that IFRS reduces managerial discretion (Barth et al. [2008]; Hamberg, Paananen, and Novak 
[2011]), NAV is also supposed to be reduced by IFRS adoption. 
However, there is counter evidence that managerial discretion does not change after IFRS adoption 
(Jeanjean, and Stolowy [2008]) or that even greater discretion has been observed (Ahmed, Neel, and Wang 
[2013]). When carrying over the implications of IFRS adoption from listed firms to the investment fund 
industry, the same caution should be applied. Moreover, how IFRS impact managerial discretion in the fund 
industry is unclear so far in the literature. While fund manager’s discretion on fund returns and assets 
valuation after IFRS adoption is yet to be studied, the NAV which reflects valuation quality of a fund is 
also an unexamined subject in IFRS literature. 
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Yip and Young (2012) examine a sample of firms in EU member countries and document that IFRS improve 
information comparability. Brochet, Jagolinzer, and Riedl (2013) put forward the position that for countries 
of high accounting quality, IFRS are less likely to affect core information quality, but increased cross-
country comparability is the driving factor of changes in capital market benefits. Canada GAAP also exhibit 
high quality like the UK in Brochet, Jagolizer, and Riedel’s (2013) study, indicating that core information 
quality may not change after Canada’s adoption of IFRS. However, Canada is so far one of the only five 
countries mandating IFRS on investment funds. Consequently, cross-country comparability has a reduced 
scope for Canada. Moreover, the other four countries are not likely to be compared by international 
investors when making decisions in Canadian capital market due to the different legal system, capital 
market development, and investor protections. Therefore, how IFRS impact cost of capital for Canadian 
investment funds may differ from what is documented for public firms in other countries.  
To summarize, the IFRS literature has not been clear on how the new reporting standards affect manager’s 
discretion due to the mixture of changing factors. As for the case of Canadian fund industry, IFRS also have 
mixed effects such as the limited improvement of reporting quality over GAAP, limited improvement of 
comparability (in fund industry only), but a material change in the requirement of disclosure of cash flows. 
2.5. Hypothesis 
 
2.51. IFRS vs Canadian GAAP 
 
IAS 7, Statement of Cash Flows, sets out the requirements for presenting such financial information without 
exemption, and full adoption of IFRS in the fund industry, therefore, means investment funds are no longer 
exempted from disclosing the information of cash flows. The transition to IFRS from GAAP for investment 
funds does not trigger substantial changes, but the differences may give fund managers higher discretion 
on the estimation of net asset value (NAV). While reversal of impairment on assets was prohibited by CICA 
HB 3051, 3025, 3063, 3064, 3475, 3862 under GAAP, it became permitted and required when reasonable 
by IAS 36, IAS 39 (replaced by IFRS 9), and IAS 40 under IFRS. Moreover, the reversal of impairment on 
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financial assets and financial instruments should not be greater than the original impairment itself according 
to CICA HB 3855 and HB 3856 under GAAP, whereas IFRS does not have the same restriction. Under 
GAAP, investments were measured at fair value, with changes in fair value recorded at profit or loss in the 
period in which it arose. According to IFRS 6 and IFRS 7, under certain cases financial instrument may not 
be measured at fair value and managers, therefore, acquires discretion on between the two choices. Ahmed 
et al. (2013) compared the firms under mandatory adoption of IFRS regimes with a benchmark group of 
firms from countries that did not adopt IFRS and find that IFRS firms exhibit significant increases in income 
smoothing and aggressive reporting of accruals, and a significant decrease in timeliness of loss recognition 
(conditional conservatism), especially for firms in strong enforcement countries. Ball et al. (2015) also point 
out that “IFRS adoption could be viewed …. as affording greater discretion to opportunistic managers, 
because its standards are perceived to be more principles-based than many prior domestic rules-based 
standards and give borrowers greater choice among alternative accounting policies as well as greater 
discretion in their implementation”. 
While a proportion of literature documents that IFRS tend to increase earnings management or smoothing 
for operating firms due to relaxed rules on earnings recognition in many countries, investment funds on the 
other hand would be affected by a counter factor that constrains earnings management, which is the 
disclosure of cash flow that was not required under Canadian GAAP and other local standards. Therefore, 
besides that fact that literature has not provided evidence how IFRS impact investment funds’ earnings 
management, the mixed effect of relaxed rules and constraints by the Statement of Cash Flows makes the 
post-IFRS behavior of fund managers more complicated and the gap in the literature in this area is 
augmented. Ashaugh and Pincus (2001) find that IFRS typically requires greater disclosure than domestic 
standards, and in the case of Canadian fund industry increased disclosure is particularly true for IFRS 
because of the statement of cash flows. 




An investment fund does not operate businesses such as manufacturing and services, and its performance 
is measured by the increase or decrease in the value of the financial assets it holds and manages. For assets 
that have quoted prices in active markets, there is no possibility of discretion otherwise investors should be 
informed by auditors. However, for assets that do not have quoted prices, the selection of valuation 
references are subject to manager’s discretion whereby many of the valuation inputs are not verifiable. 
Level 2 assets involve selection of similar assets in an active market, and Level 3 assets involve valuation 
techniques based on inputs that are not observable in the market. Song, Thomas, and Yi (2010) document 
that stock market investors price each dollar of Level 1, 2, and 3 assets at $0.98, $0.97, $0.68, suggesting 
the significantly reduced reliability of Level 3 assets that are subject to managers’ discretion. Goh et al. 
(2015) also document that Level 3 fair value are typically priced lower due to manager’s discretion. 
Financial analysts are not confident in the valuation of Level 3 assets either, as Magnan, Menini, and 
Parbonetti (2015) document increased earnings forecast dispersion when Level 3 assets represent a greater 
proportion of a bank’s assets.  
While investment funds did not have to disclose cash flow under GAAP, managers could manipulate the 
fair value of assets reported at Level 2 and Level 3 more freely due to lack of efficient constraint. For 
example, if a fund holds private bond A and values it at price X assuming cash flows as contracted, there 
was no way of verification on the assumed cash flow from financial reports under GAAP, if the fund 
chooses not to disclose cash flows voluntarily. In case the borrower had any unfulfilled payment but the 
fund manager decided not to inform unit holders, there is no efficient evidence to challenge the valuation 
of bond A. Similarly, if a fund holds loans that could not produce the cash flow as contracted, the Statement 
of Cash Flows functions as the restraint in hiding information. Therefore, investment funds that hold private 
fixed-income assets are less likely to manipulate of the fair value of such assets because of the required 
disclosure of cash flows under IFRS after 2014. About $8 billion of private debt deals were done in Canada 
in 2016, in contrast to about $60.3 billion of corporate debt raised in the public markets (according to 
Financial Post Data Group). An estimated 9% of total bond investment are placed privately, and IFRS 
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should have an observable impact on the fair value measurement of this asset class. Meanwhile, large 
market players such as TD, Manulife, Sun Life, Mackenzie, and Ridgewood are increasing holdings of 
private fixed income securities in their portfolios, as a response to the decreasing yield on public bonds. 
Investments in the private bonds are primarily held by life insurance, mortgage and real estate, and high-
yield bond funds in Canada, which represent about 8% of the Canadian closed-end fund industry.  
For example, RBC Private Canadian Corporate Bond Pool was not a voluntary reporter of cash flows 
before 2014, while it held primarily private bonds (97% of its total assets). Investors of this fund had no 
access to information such as cash flows from private bonds and their concentration of risks which is also 
required later by IFRS. Investors are generally aware of the opacity of privately placed bonds, but the 
increased disclosure imposed by IFRS in the investment fund industry may mitigate the informational 
asymmetry between investors and fund managers. On the other hand, Marret Investment Grade Bond Fund 
which did voluntarily disclose cash flows before 2014 also conveys more information to its investors as 
“Interest received” is separately disclosed in the mandatory statement of cash flows, whereas its voluntary 
disclosure before 2014 did not include this detail which is a source of verification of the fund’s performance 
and assets valuation. Therefore, whether a fund did or did not voluntarily disclose the statement of cash 
flows before the adoption of IFRS, the mandatory statement of cash flows contributes to increased financial 
disclosure that is accessible to investors. 
Riedl and Serafeim (2011) provide evidence that investors suspect the overestimating of future cash flows 
from Level 3 assets. Under both GAAP and IFRS, the Statement of Investment Transactions is not 
mandatory. However, after 2014, funds have to report cash flows paid for the purchase of investments and 
received from proceeds of investments. This additional information also contributes to the better reliability 
of assets reported at fair value Level 2 and Level 3, for the reason that if an investment fund consistently 
overestimates its asset value, the Cash Flow of next year should consistently be lower than expectation 
based on Fair Value of unquoted assets. Therefore, knowing that the cash flow from proceeds of investments 
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will be disclosed in the upcoming year, managers have less incentive to optimistically appraise the value of 
assets in the current year, resulting in more prudent appraisal every year under IFRS. 
A fund’s unit price is also affected by the risk factor of itself. When an investment fund holds a Forward 
Contract and has increased its leverage, a payment to the creditor is required to maintain the agreed leverage. 
This payment is only reported in the Statement of Cash Flows, and the increased leverage, which implies a 
higher risk of the fund, was not disclosed in financial reports under GAAP. As they are usually considered 
to be a Level 2 asset, forward contracts were more prone to value manipulation under manager’s discretion 
until IFRS required the statement of cash flows which informs investors whether the fund has increased its 
leverage due to change of asset value. Without the repayment of leverage from the Statement of Cash Flows, 
investors can only see a leverage ratio that is always no greater than a certain threshold such as 25% in 
many cases, giving the impression that the fund’s risk is under control. However, when investors see that 
the fund paid millions to the creditor to maintain this ratio from the Statement of Cash Flow, a more reliable 
image of the fund is revealed. In this scenario, a manager has less incentive to manipulate fair value because 
of the verification effect of cash payments for leverage.  
The Statement of Cash Flows increases disclosure in the fund industry and imposes further restraints to 
managers’ discretion, and when comparing between manager’s discretion before and after IFRS, a reduction 
of such discretionary appraisal is expected. Hence, the first hypothesis: 
H1: closed-end funds have lower discretionary appraisal after the adoption of IFRS. 
According to prior research (Song, Thomas, Yi [2010]; Ettredge, Xu, and Yi [2014]; Christensen and 
Nikolaev [2013]; Christensen, Glover, and Wood [2012]), level 2 assets rely strongly on observable market 
inputs and are hence less prone to discretion whereas level 3 assets involve unobservable inputs and are 
hence subject to greater possibility of discretion for the purpose of return management. However, under 
IFRS, a new circumstance could be that level 3 (usually private placements and illiquid bonds) assets are 
more accurately valued than before because of the disclosure of cash flows (H1), managers now have to 
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give level 2 assets greater weights for return adjustments. In other words, to achieve the same return target, 
managers can adjust Level 3 assets less than before so that they have to manage the valuation of Level 2 
assets more than before.  
Although in general Level 2 assets are more precisely valued than Level 3 assets, IFRS could impact the 
precision of Level 3 assets more than it does on the precision of Level 2 assets. Since most Level 2 assets 
rely on similar securities for valuation purposes, IFRS have no direct impact on the valuation and return of 
Level 2 assets. On the other hand, most Level 3 assets are private placements of which the valuation model 
involves cash flows that were not disclosed before IFRS, so the disclosure of cash flows under IFRS has a 
direct impact on the valuation of and return on Level 3 assets with an increased constraining effect. As a 
result, Level 3 assets are less prone to managers’ discretion under IFRS, but if a manager still wanted to 
overstate assets value, he/she had to give Level 2 assets more weight compared with his/her options under 
GAAP. To summarize, although the valuation of Level 2 assets typically includes less discretion than Level 
3 assets, the indirect impact of IFRS may cause fund managers to focus more on Level 2 assets for return 
management because the fair value measurement of Level 3 assets is not as discretionary as it was under 
GAAP. Hence, the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Closed-end funds have greater valuation/return management on Level 2 assets after 
the adoption of IFRS. 
Return management is proxied by the difference between the returns on unquoted assets and quoted assets. 
Assuming fund managers have the same investing competence in quoted and unquoted assets, the more the 
deviation between the reported returns on these two categories of assets, the greater discretion is captured. 
For example, if a manager can earn -5% on public traded securities, his/her investments in private 
placements should earn -5% as well. Otherwise, if his/her true ability can earn 5% from private placements, 
he/she would have made all investments in private placements or work in a fund that holds solely private 
placements so as to make 5% instead of an aggregated return somewhere between -5% and 5%. In other 
words, if a manager reports a -5% return on quoted securities and a 5% return on unquoted securities, a 
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return overstatement on unquoted securities is suspected. Therefore, return management is measured as the 
difference between the return on Level 2 or Level 3 assets and return on Level 1 assets. 
On average, investment funds hold most of their assets in Level 1 and the least proportion in Level 3. As a 
result, Level 3 assets represent 4.66% of the total fair value, whereas Level 1 assets represent 79.8% of the 
total value among Canadian investment funds that hold different levels of financial assets (data 2012 to 
2016). This allocation of assets results in managers not typically adjusting the valuation of level 3 assets to 
offset the losses in Level 1 assets because of the disproportioned amount of investment. As for Level 2 
assets that represent 15.6% of an average fund’s total fair value, the loss from this category of assets can 
easily be filled by optimistically appraised value in Level 3 assets. Because the fair value of Level 2 assets 
is determined based on the market price of similar securities that are traded in active markets, the loss and 
profit on Level 2 assets, in general, are less likely to be manipulated by managers with significant alteration. 
However, when appraising the value of Level 3 assets, managers might take into consideration the 
performance of Level 2 assets and report a favorable aggregated return on total unquoted securities which 
includes both Level 2 and Level 3 assets. Under the assumption that a manager has the same competence 
across all levels of financial assets, a deviation and negative correlation between the returns of Level 2 and 
Level 3 assets is also considered a signal of discretion. This negative correlation can be reduced by IFRS 
as the mandatory disclosure of cash flows put stronger restraints on the valuation of Level 3 assets to fill 
the losses from Level 2 assets. 
With the reallocated weight of focus between Level 2 and Level 3 assets, managers may exercise greater 
discretionary judgment in the selection of reference securities for the valuation of Level 2 assets while 
exercising less discretion for the selection of the inputs for the valuation of Level 3 assets. Chander and 
Bricker (2002) and Bollen and Pool (2009) separate funds’ returns into two components: the non-
discretionary returns from liquid assets and discretionary returns from illiquid securities. When funds’ 
discretionary returns are adjusted upward and conditionally on the underperformance of non-discretionary 
securities, Chandar and Bricker (2002) interpret such conditional deviation of discretionary and non-
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discretionary returns as return management. Assuming Level 1 assets are not subject to any sort of 
discretion and that managers have to raise discretionary returns to offset losses from non-discretionary 
(Level 1) assets, Level 2 return is expected to have a stronger negative association with Level 1 return, 
whereas Level 3 return is expected to have a weaker negative association with Level 1 return, compared to 
the situation under GAAP. However, it is not clear how the returns of Level 2 and Level 3 are correlated. 
One hypothesis is that Level 2 return and Level 3 return are both adjusted in the same direction for a positive 
association, and another hypothesis is that Level 2 return and Level 3 return move differently as one is used 
to neutralize the losses from the other.  
H2b: Closed-end funds have a greater negative association between the returns of Level 1 and 
Level 2 assets after IFRS. 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2011) argue that investors discount less reliable accounting information 
when valuing securities, but the reliability of information on the same type of assets may vary when 
managers manipulate its valuation according to different targets. For example, when a manager over 
appraises a security X by 5% in year t but 3% in year t+1 due to different market conditions and earnings 
objectives, the reliability of the accounting information on this particular asset X is not constant from year 
t to year t+1 even in the same fund’s portfolio. In this company’s financial report, security X has lower 
reliability in year t when its value is overstated by 5% but better reliability in year t+1 when its value is 
overstated by 3%. As a result, the reliability of securities is contingent on external factors such as regulatory 
and industry changes and internal factors such as current performance and earnings objective that may 
affect the securities’ valuation bias. In the Canadian context following IFRS adoption, the reliabilities of 
Level 2 and Level 3 assets among investment funds can change due to accounting standards transition after 
2014. While the disclosure of cash flows reduces the discretion of return on Level 3 assets, Level 2 assets 
receive more weight when managers manipulate reported performance. To summarize, Level 2 assets are 
expected to be less reliable after the adoption of IFRS but Level 3 assets are expected to have increased 
reliability, and this change of reliability is translated to a greater association between Level 2 return and 
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NAV discount but a reduced association between Level 3 return and NAV discount. Hence, the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: NAV discount has a greater association with the return of Level 2 assets after the adoption of 
IFRS. 
2.6. Research design 
 
2.6.1 Sample and Data 
 
The sample of this paper includes the closed-end funds actively listed on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
from 2012 to 2016 (for funds with the fiscal year ending before the 31st of December, this requirement 
extends to 2017). The sample initially covers 231 closed-end funds actively traded on TSX as of December 
31 of 2016. However, after excluding funds that restructured during 2012 to 2016, funds that were formed 
after 2014, funds that do not have annual financial reports available at SEDAR filing system, the sample 
finally consists of 183 closed-end funds trading at TSX. However, not every fund provides enough details 
to identify. There are funds that labeling each security with its fair value level in the statement of the 
investment portfolio, but many funds list securities without their valuation methods. For how to identify a 
security’s fair value level if such information is not disclosed in the fund’s report, Appendix 1 describes 
how fair value levels are identified in this paper using linear programming method. 
Financial data are entered from annual reports of Canadian closed-end funds downloaded from SEDAR 
filing system. Cash is excluded if a fund report cash as level 1 assets. However, cash equivalents of which 
the fair values change over time remain included in Level 1 assets. Closing prices of each closed-end fund 
at its end-of-fiscal-year day are retrieved from Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (CFMRC). 
2.6.2 Measurements 
 
a) Asset appreciation and returns 
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Investment funds’ boards are required by regulations (e.g., Investment Company Act in the US and National 
Instruments NI 81-102 in Canada) to determine the fair values of their underlying investments, and the 
book returns are calculated by the change of self-reported investments values. Here I use two metrics to 
measure the returns. First, the differential between the fair value and the book value (cost) of securities, i.e., 
the unrealized gain or loss, provides an indication of return on investment and is thus used as a proxy. 
Second, I use the book return, which is the period-to-period change in the fair value of total or pertaining 
securities. Following Chandar and Bricker (2002), the discretionary return is calculated as the unrealized 
return from Level 2 and Level 3 assets, and non-discretionary return is calculated by subtracting the 
discretionary return from the total return. They argue that realized gains are not subject to manager’s 
discretion, and they use unrealized gains to infer manager’s discretion on restricted securities. Realized 
gains capture the real economic performance on the fair market, no manager’s discretion can affect the 
realized gains. However, unrealized gains are calculated on manager’s appraised valuation of investments, 
change in unrealized gains from year to year captures manager’s estimate of performance. Philips, Pincus, 
Rego, and Wan (2004) report that unrealized gains and losses, alongside several other measurements, can 
be used to detect earnings management. With a post-IFRS sample from Hong Kong, Chen and Tang (2017) 
document that executive compensation in property companies incorporates unrealized gains, and it can be 
inferred that managers have the incentive to raise unrealized gains for higher compensation. 
𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 = (𝐹𝑉𝑡 − 𝐻𝐶𝑡)/𝐻𝐶𝑡 
𝐿1_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑡 = (𝐿1_𝐹𝑉𝑡 − 𝐿1_𝐻𝐶𝑡)/𝐿1_𝐻𝐶𝑡 
𝐿2_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 = (𝐿2_𝐹𝑉𝑡 − 𝐿2_𝐻𝐶𝑡)/𝐿2_𝐻𝐶𝑡 
𝐿3_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 = (𝐿3_𝐹𝑉𝑡 − 𝐿3_𝐻𝐶𝑡)/𝐿3_𝐻𝐶𝑡 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 =(𝐿2_𝐹𝑉𝑡 + 𝐿3_𝐹𝑉𝑡 − 𝐿2_𝐻𝐶𝑡 − 𝐿3_𝐻𝐶𝑡)/(𝐿2_𝐻𝐶𝑡 + 𝐿3_𝐻𝐶𝑡) 
Where 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 is the unrealized gain or loss of securities, FV is the fair value of securities, and HC is the 
historical cost of securities. L1, L2, and L3 represent Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 securities respectively. 
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Lidq and Illq represent liquid securities with active market price and illiquid securities without active market 
price, respectively. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = (𝐹𝑉𝑡 − 𝐹𝑉𝑡−1)/𝐹𝑉𝑡−1 
𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = (L2_𝐹𝑉𝑡 − L2_𝐹𝑉𝑡−1)/L2_𝐹𝑉𝑡−1 
𝐿3_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = (L3_𝐹𝑉𝑡 − L3_𝐹𝑉𝑡−1)/L3_𝐹𝑉𝑡−1 
Where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the book return of a fund’s total investments, 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 is the return of Level 2 securities, 
L2_𝐹𝑉𝑡 is the fair value of Level 2 securities excluding that are sold and acquired in year t, and L2_𝐹𝑉𝑡−1 
is the fair value of Level 2 securities excluding that are sold in year t. Therefore, 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 and 𝐿3_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 
capture the returns on the same Level 2 and Level 3 securities from year t-1 to year t. 
Total return from illiquid securities is calculated as follows: 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡= 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡+ 𝐿3_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡; 
And total non-discretionary return, according to Chandar and Bricker (2002), is calculated by subtracting 
return of illiquid securities from total return: 
𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 
b) Valuation and Return Management 
Chandar and Bricker (2002) theoretically separate return on illiquid securities into two components: 
discretionary part and non-discretionary part. Since illiquid securities involve manager’s judgment, their 
reported return consists of underlying return that is determined by economic reasons and manipulated return 
that is resulted from manager’s discretion. However, both the discretionary part and non-discretionary parts 
are not observable, so Chandar and Bricker (2002) use the return from liquid securities as a proxy for, and 
a reasonable expectation of, the non-discretionary part of illiquid securities. Therefore, the difference 
between the reported returns of illiquid securities and the proxy measures discretionary return, which is 
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also interpreted as return management. Similar to the idea by Chandar and Bricker (2002), the discussion 
in this paper illustrates that if a fund manager can make more return in illiquid securities than he/she can 
do in liquid securities, the equilibrium should be such manager investing all assets in illiquid securities or 
working in a fund holds solely illiquid securities to earn the maximum return. Otherwise, when a fund 
reports different return rates in liquid and illiquid securities, the difference is a proxy for return management. 
The management of valuation on Level 2 and Level 3 assets are calculated in the same way as that of the 
management of returns. 
𝐿2_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝐿2_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 − 𝐿1_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 
𝐿3_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝐿3_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 − 𝐿1_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 
L2_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛_Mngmt is the management in unrealized gain or loss on Level 2 securities, and it equals to the 
difference between unrealized gain or loss on Level 2 and Level 1 securities. Similarly return management 
is calculated as follows: 
𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡 
𝐿3_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡 = 𝐿3_𝑅𝑒𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡 
c) NAV Discount 
The last dependent variable is NAV discount representing the difference between fund’s closing price at 
the end of a fiscal year compared to NAV reported in the financial statement of the same fiscal year. The 
discount for each fund is calculated as follows: 
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝑁𝐴𝑉 − 𝑃; 
where NAV is the net asset value per common share of a fund and P is the closing price per share on the 
last day of a fiscal year. A positive value produced by this equation is a discount, whereas a negative value 
produced by this equation is a premium which exists in practice but not in a large amount of cases. 
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2.6.3 Regression Specifications 
 
a) To test H1 the following model is used.  
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
+ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑞_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the unrealized gain or loss (scaled) rate of illiquid securities consisted of Level 2 and Level 3 
assets; 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the unrealized gain or loss (scaled) of liquid securities consisted of Level 1 assets; 
Vol_Cash equals to 1 if a fund voluntarily disclosed cash flows before IFRS adoption; 
IFRS equals to 1 if the fiscal year if after the adoption of IFRS.  
This model tests how the valuation of illiquid securities (Level 2 and Level 3) is correlated with the 
valuation of liquid securities (Level 1) under the impact of IFRS adoption. In this paper, IFRS adoption is 
predicted to contribute to better alignment between unrealized gain or loss on illiquid securities and that of 
liquid securities. Moreover, voluntary disclosure of cash flows is also supposed to enhance such alignment. 
b) To test H2a the following models are used. 
𝐿2_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟_𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡
= 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑡
= 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
Incentive is the relative performance of a fund compared to the industry average or its previous annual 
performance in each specification. These models test how valuation and return discretions are related with 
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Incentive and the adoption of IFRS. In this paper, Incentive is predicted to have a negative association with 
valuation and returns management after the adoption of IFRS and disclosure of cash flows. 
To test H2b the following models are used. 
𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 +  𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡
∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
𝐿3_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 +  𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
+ 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
These models test how valuation and returns of Level 2 and Level 3 assets are related to Level 1 assets with 
the impact of IFRS adoption. In this paper, IFRS is predicted to contribute to a negative association between 
the valuation and returns of Level 1 assets and those of Level 2 assets. Moreover, IFRS is also predicted to 
contribute to a negative association between the valuation and returns of Level 2 assets and those of Level 
3 assets. 
c) To test H3 the following models are used: 
𝑁𝐴𝑉_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝐿1_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟 +  𝐿2_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟 + 𝐿3_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝐿2_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟
∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐿2_𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
𝑁𝐴𝑉_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑑_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 +  𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝐿3_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡
∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐿2_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
This model measures how NAV discount is related with valuation and returns with the impact of IFRS. 
Prior research document that NAV discount is increased with the use of Level 2 and Level 3 valuation, but 
a link between the valuation and returns of Level 2 and Level 3 assets have not been established in the 
literature. In this paper, NAV discount is predicted to be positively related to the valuation and returns of 






2.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In general, compared with unrealized gains from Level 2 and Level 3 securities, unrealized gains from 
Level 1 securities have less variance across Canadian investment funds. Level 3 securities exhibit the most 
dispersed book return rate, as the valuation of such securities relies on more subjective inputs. After the 
adoption of IFRS, the unrealized gain is higher for Level 2 securities and lower for Level 3 securities, which 
is in line with the argument that IFRS have a greater impact on the valuation of Level 3 securities than on 
Level 2 securities. The industry average NAV discount does not show an obvious difference before and 
after IFRS adoption.  
2.7.2 Preliminary Descriptions 
 
a) Return Management on Assets of Different Fair Value Levels: 
[Insert Chart 1 about here] 
From Chart 1, we can see strong evidence of return management, especially among level 2 and level 3 
assets, in Canadian fund industry. When level 2 assets have higher unrealized gain through fair value, level 
3 assets are reported at lower value to reserve unrealized gain for next year. When level 2 assets have lower 
unrealized gain through fair value, level 3 assets are reported at a higher value to offset the loss in level 2. 
In the year when both level 1 and level 2 assets are reporting reduced returns, Level 3 assets are appraised 
at a higher value. Hence, this suggests that total returns hold steady. To summarize, while the year of 2014 
welcomed the adoption of IFRS which requires enriched disclosure, the return management among Level 
2 and Level 3 investments is more profound under the new regulation.  
35 
 
b) Return management and NAV discount 
[Insert Chart 2 about here] 
Although the adoption of IFRS is supposed to increase disclosure quality and value relevance, market prices 
of fund units suggest differently: on average, NAV discount has increased from 2.67% in 2012 to 4.45% in 
2015, indicating that the valuation of fund assets becomes less precise. Interestingly, the movement of NAV 
discount has a similar pattern to Level 3 asset returns (Chart 1). This pattern echoes with the argument that 
when Level 2 assets experience losses, managers possibly overstate the value of Level 3 assets to maintain 
a positive return on total unquoted financial assets. As a result, the overstated fair value of Level 3 assets 
leads to greater NAV discount which represents investors’ lower valuation of managers’ optimistic 
appraisal. The strong co-movement between return on Level 3 assets and the NAV discount is consistent 
with the argument made by Hammami (2014) that the relative amount of Level 3 assets increases the 
discount. However, in this paper the link is not between the amount of Level 3 assets and NAV discount 
but between the return of Level 3 assets and NAV discount, because not all level 3 assets have the same 
level of overvaluation which is a determinant of NAV discount, and the overvaluation can be more precisely 
captured by the discretionary return of Level 3 assets.  
c) Hypothesis tests 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In general fair values of liquid and illiquid securities move in the same direction, as shown in Table 3 Panel 
A. However, Canadian closed-end funds that hold both actively-traded (liquid)securities and not-actively-
traded (illiquid) securities show a higher rate of unrealized gain in the latter category. For each 1%  
unrealized gain reported in liquid securities, a fund reports 1.79% (t=3.81, P=0.0002) unrealized gain in 




Table 3 Panel B does not show a strong correlation between the total book returns of liquid and illiquid 
securities. IFRS do not strongly impact the association between Illq_ret and Liqd_ret in all investment 
funds, but their strongest effect is on the funds that did voluntarily disclose cash flows, shown by the 
significance of Liqd_ret interacted with Vol_Cash and IFRS (coefficient=-1.8351, t=-2.51, and p=0.0131). 
Daske et al. (2013) define “serious” adopters of IFRS as firms that have individual characteristics for more 
transparent disclosure. Those with firm-level factors leading to more transparent reporting features benefit 
more from IFRS adoption, and those with firm-level factors leading to less transparent reporting features 
benefit less from IFRS adoption. Bonetti, Magnan, and Parbonetti (2016) confirm the firm-level factors on 
the effect of IFRS from a governance perspective. Similarly, the Canadian context also shows that an 
individual firm-level factor, which is voluntary disclosure of cash flows, affects the consequences of IFRS 
adoption among the investment funds. 
To summarize, Canadian investment funds report a higher unrealized gain on illiquid securities than that 
on liquid securities. The voluntary disclosure of cash flows reduces such deviation, and IFRS adoption 
enhances the reducing effect among “serious” adopters that did voluntarily disclose cash flows. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 Panel A shows that return management on Level 2 assets among Canadian investment funds does 
exist, as when a fund is underperforming compared to last year’s results, managers try to reverse the 
underperformance by raising Level 2 unrealized gain. Return management measured by the unrealized gain 
(Gain_Mngmt) is significant (t= 3.49 and p=0.0007) regardless of the accounting system being GAAP or 
IFRS. However, return management is reduced by voluntary disclosure of cash flows (t=-3.36 and 
p=0.0011). The adoption of IFRS also constrains return management, as shown by the negative association 
between return on Level 2 assets and Incentive combined with IFRS (t=-1.81 and p=0.0729). 
When proxying Incentive by a fund’s performance relative to industry average as shown in Table 4 Panel 
B, return management is also significantly related with Incentive (t=2.69 and p=0.0079). In accordance to 
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the argument that disclosure of cash flows constrains the valuation of Level 3 securities, Vol_Cash leads to 
higher return management in Level 2 securities (t=2.16 and p=0.0322). However, IFRS require more 
disclosure besides the Statement of Cash Flows, such as quantitative concentrations of risk for investment 
securities by IFRS 7, and such disclosure reduces manager’s discretion in the selection of fair value inputs. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Similar to Level 1 assets, Level 2 assets are also based on market inputs and less prone to manager’s 
discretion. Moreover, Level 2 assets make up a much smaller proportion of a fund’s total assets, so 
managers do not have effective ways to use Level 2 assets to compensate losses on Level 1 assets. In a 
precisely disclosed financial report, Level 1 and Level 2 assets are expected to have similar returns because 
the fund manager has similar ability in investing in different categories of assets, otherwise he/she would 
have made all the investments in the category that he/she has the knowledge to earn more or worked in a 
fund that holds solely the category of assets that he/she has better knowledge.  Results from Table 5 support 
the argument that Level 2 and Level 1 assets are in general determined by similar market inputs, and, as a 
result, their returns are strongly correlated in a positive manner (coefficient=1.5245; t=3.78; p=0.0002). 
However, Level 2 securities show higher return compared with Level 1 securities as for each 1% of the 
unrealized gain on Level 1 securities, Canadian investment funds report 1.52% of the unrealized gain in 
Level 2 securities. In accordance with the prediction, IFRS shift more discretion from Level 3 assets to 
Level 2 assets so that unrealized gains in Level 2 assets become less aligned with the unrealized gain in 
Level 1 assets (coefficient=-1.4985; t=-3.26; p=0.0013). “Serious adopters” that did voluntarily disclose 
cash flows under GAAP show an additional divergence between unrealized gain from Level 1 and Level 2 
assets after the adoption of IFRS. Although IFRS adoption has a stronger effect in “serious adopters” than 
in “label adopters”, the effect may lie mainly on Level 3 securities as discussed before. As a result, those 
“serious adopters” shift more discretion to Level 2 securities that are not well constrained by IFRS, and the 
post-IFRS unrealized gain on Level 2 securities is more affected by the discretionary valuation of Level 2 
securities and less aligned with the unrealized gain in Level 1 securities. 
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
With regard to Level 3 assets (e.g., private debt) which involve less verifiable inputs from public sources, 
the disclosure of cash flows adds one of the most reliable information pieces into a fund’s financial reports. 
For this reason, the return of Level 3 assets (L3_Gain) is expected to be better aligned with the return of 
Level 1 assets, but this hypothesis is not well supported as IFRS adoption has no significant impact on the 
correlation between returns from Level 1 and Level 3 investments. However, the strongest factor is the 
voluntary disclosure (t=-4.05 and p=0.0004). Investment funds that did voluntarily disclose cash flows 
under GAAP show a significant reduction in the unrealized gain on Level 3 securities (L3_Gain). These 
results suggest that funds that did not voluntarily disclose cash flows have information to hide for the 
purpose of optimistically appraising the fair value of Level 3 assets.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
NAV_Discount is significantly associated with unrealized gain from Level 2 assets if a fund did voluntarily 
disclose cash flows. However, the association is not in the direction as I predict that voluntary disclosure 
of cash flows shifts managers’ discretion from Level 3 securities to Level 2 securities so that voluntary 
disclosure of cash flows increases the positive association between Level 2 valuation and NAV discount. 
The other variable of interest, which is IFRS adoption, does increase the positive association as predicted 
between Level 2 valuation and NAV discount, but for “serious adopters” only. This diverted effect of IFRS 
adoption on funds that did and did not voluntarily disclose cash flows again sheds light on the stream of 
studies emphasizing firm-specific factors that affect the outcome of IFRS adoption. Although IFRS have 
increased disclosure compared to GAAP, the change is more effectively translated into value relevant 
information among the investment funds that have had the intention for more transparent reports, as proxied 
by voluntary disclosure of cash flows.  




Discretionary and non-discretionary assets are supposed to have similar returns given they are managed by 
the same fund. However, Canadian investment funds that did not voluntarily disclose cash flows under 
GAAP show a pattern of deviated returns between discretionary and non-discretionary assets, implying that 
these funds raise (lower) the return of Level 2 and Level 3 assets to neutralize losses (gains) from Level 1 
assets. This negative association between discretionary and non-discretionary assets is reduced after the 
adoption of IFRS among non-voluntary reporters because of the additional restraint of cash flow disclosure. 
Canadian funds in general, regardless of their voluntary disclosure of cash flows, show significantly aligned 
returns from discretionary and non-discretionary  assets after IFRS, supporting my argument that with 
precise valuation discretionary  and non-discretionary  assets should have similar returns as managers do 
not have to invest in assets that they have less knowledge while they can invest in other assets that they 
have better knowledge. 
Discretionary assets include Level 2 and Level 3 investments, and the following steps decompose 
discretionary assets to see if Level 2 and Level 3 investments have different changes after IFRS adoption. 
Under the assumption of similar returns of discretionary and non-discretionary return, the difference 
between discretionary returns and non-discretionary returns is defined as a proxy for return management. 
A fund’s underperformance strongly increases the incentive for return management, and return management 
is higher among funds that did not voluntarily disclose cash flows. However, return management on Level 
2 assets is also higher after IFRS, for which the explanation is that Level 2 assets gain more focus of 
manager’s discretion when Level 3 assets are restrained by the disclosure of cash flows under IFRS. Return 
management on Level 3 assets is also higher among fund that did not voluntarily disclose cash flows, but 
no reduction is observed after the adoption of IFRS whereas a reduction effect of IFRS on Level 3 returns 
is expected. 
Although discretionary assets include both Level 2 and Level 3 investments, they may not have the same 
direction of discretion. Using Level 1 return as a proxy of underlying performance, evidence shows that 
Level 2 and Level 3 assets are generally moving towards different directions among funds that did not 
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disclose cash flows. This divergence is interpreted as discretionary adjustment of the valuation of Level 2 
and Level 3 assets. IFRS do not have significant impact to reduce this discretion, but the new accounting 
policy results in fund managers giving Level 3 less weight after IFRS and focusing more on Level 2 
investments for return management, as evidence shows a divergence between Level 1 and Level 2 returns 
emerges after IFRS, which was not a significant fact before IFRS. 
Due to the fact that many countries exempt investment funds from reporting under IFRS, the fund industry 
has not been empirically studied by the IFRS literature. This paper documents that, in the Canadian context, 
IFRS adoption leads to reduced discretion in the investment fund industry’s financial report in general, 
while IFRS adoption also shifts more discretion from Level 3 securities to Level 2 securities. Moreover, 
voluntary disclosure of cash flows before required by IFRS also contributes to less biased valuation of 
investment securities. Implications from this study are relevant to accounting profession and regulation. 
First, while regulators across different countries have concerns for full adoption of IFRS in the investment 
funds, mandatory disclosure of cash flows can increase transparency and reduce discretion. For instance, 
US  GAAP only requires an investment company to present the statement of cash flows when it holds above 
10% of securities in Level 3 investments. However, Level 3 investments account for 2% of an average US 
closed-end fund’s total assets (Hammami [2014]). As a result, most US closed-end funds are exempt from 
disclosing cash flows which constrains fund managers’ discretion. Second, while IFRS in general reduce 
discretion among investment funds, regulators need to be cautious about the different effects on Level 2 
and Level 3 assets. The disclosure of cash flows and adoption of IFRS have a stronger constraint on Level 
3 assets, but this uneven effect leads to relatively more discretion on Level 2 assets. How to increase 
disclosure on the determinants of valuation on Level 2 assets is a question worth future research by 




Chapter 3  
 




This paper follows a sample of 231 outside directors who retired, resigned, or stepped down during 2009 
through 2011 from 145 of S&P 500 firms. The main finding of this paper is that unless the director has a 
disagreement with the rest of board or there is another kind of obvious trouble, firm’s cumulative abnormal 
return around the director’s notification of leave is to my surprise positive, although a director’s leave does 
not sound good to investors. However, the decreasing long-run return of these firms may say something. I 
conjecture that directors who have known negative inside information might time their notifications of 
departure decision to avoid being involved in an adverse situation, and evidence for this hypothesis are 
presented from different angles. 







To mitigate the conflict between principals and agents, shareholders entrust board of directors to 
oversee a firm’s operation and to meet in a more frequent manner than shareholders are able to. Outside 
directors that have no connection with management ensure the independence of board which consists of 
both inside and outside directors. Directorships are attractive positions in the sense that a director receives 
multiple sorts of benefits from the seat in the boardroom. In the labor market of directors, vigilant directors 
establish their reputations by stewarding shareholders’ wealth and secure their directorships with durative 
good reputation. Reputable directors get reelected by shareholders and also get rewarded with positions on 
the boards of other firms. As for the rewards, although outside directors do not have a material relationship 
with the company and do not receive any bonus from good performance, they can obtain benefits such as 
business connections, diversity of experience, fame, and monetary compensation for directorships. An 
inside director is usually a top executive of a firm in which he/she spend a great amount of time, whereas 
an outside director has much less time commitment to one firm and is hence possible to serve on the boards 
of different firms in the same year.  
Although Interlocking directorate in companies competing in the same industry has been prohibited 
by The Clayton Antitrust Act since 1914, multiple directorships of outside directors are very common across 
industries. The demand for outside directors has been increasing whereas the supply remains very limited, 
resulting in the situation that about 83% of board members are outside directors and about 17% directors 
hold two-or-more firms’ board positions (PwC, 2009). After the dot-com crisis and audit scandals, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 requires the entire audit committee of all public companies to consist 
of independent directors. Since 2003, NYSE has required that all firms listed on NYSE to establish audit, 
nominating, and compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors. Nasdaq in the same 
year started to require that a majority of the board of directors of a listed company are independent. As the 
regulations strongly increased the demand for outside directors, post-SOX boards are larger and more 
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independent (Linck et al. [2009]), and over-boarding consequently exists in virtually all public firms as the 
supply of directors does not increase correspondingly.  
While outside directors in modern corporations usually hold positions on more than one board, the 
likelihood of relinquishing one of the positions also increased because they have more positions left in the 
pocket. In addition, multiple directorships imply over commitment and reduced attention to each firm. 
When a reputable business expert holds positions on boards of several companies, he/she faces the 
exaggerated challenge of time allocation among companies each requires a large amount of time 
commitment in geographically different locations. If a director cannot allocate enough time and diligence 
to monitor a firm, he/she may encounter higher potential risk on individual reputation if either the manager 
exploits shareholder’s wealth or shareholders question the director’s diligence. Consequently, the cost 
(including opportunity cost) from one directorship increases with each additional position a director takes 
while the benefit does not makeup accordingly, because an outside director does not receive any bonus 
from the firm performance. As a result, an outside director may give up the position which makes the least 
sense in terms of potential, if not existing, extra cost including workload, risk, and liability. For an outside 
director who has no other material connection with the company, relinquishing the directorship would only 
result in a small amount of loss compared to what he/she can retain from other positions, and the likelihood 
of departure is relatively higher than that of inside directors when firm underperformance is advent. This 
means that an outside director can make the decision of resigning or stepping down almost purely based on 
his/her own contemplation on future performance because of the limited detriment to personal wealth and 
relatively loose contract, whereas an inside director who decides to leave the board usually also has to 
resign from the executive position that he/she holds. I consider the departure of outside directors to be less 
affected by factors other than the potential risk in the firm and a more timely reflection of inside information 
regarding future performance. To summarize, an outside director can lose substantial human capital if good 
reputation is not maintained, but he/she also has more flexibility in terms of time chosen to leave the board. 
Therefore, when anticipating underperformance of any kind in the future, an outside director’s rational 
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decision is to relinquish the riskiest board seat so as to protect other profitable positions and announce the 
decision at a time to the best interests of himself/herself.  
When an outside director foresees adverse circumstances of a firm at some point, the decision of 
departure does not have to be announced immediately as long as the departure can take effect before the 
possible adverse situation with a reasonable safety margin. For example, if an outside director anticipates 
the business of a company to be declining in the year of t+1, he/she may announce the decision of 
resignation a few months ahead of the end of year t to stay clear from the underperformance of year t+1. 
To prevent media and investors from suspecting anything, the director can choose a day around which there 
is no unfavorable news about the firm released to pretend that the resignation is not associated with anything 
about the firm but is a purely personal decision. A director can even choose a day around which the stock 
performance is on the rise and pretend that the resignation decision is so reluctantly made because the firm 
is doing well, but by doing so a director can shirk the latent responsibility of overseeing a troubled firm 
while maintaining the image of conscientious watchdog so that the seats in other boardrooms are secured. 
To test this conjecture, this paper follows a sample of S&P 500 firms in which at least one outside 
director quit the board during 2009 through 2011, and this turnover involves 231 individuals and 145 firms. 
With a focus on the announcement of departure decisions which include earlier retirement, resignation, and 
stepping down, this paper examines the pre-event market condition, immediate market impact, and long-
run consequence. Results of this paper suggest that many outside directors time the market to leave at the 
favorable window when the stock return is on the rise but after when some trouble emerges.  
RiskMetrics on WRDS is employed first to figure out a list of outside directors who are recorded in a 
given year but not in the following year, I consider them as having left the board in that given year. In the 
second step, Factiva News Database is used to search for the names of each “disappeared” director and the 
corresponding firm to obtain the detailed information about the reason of, and explanation for, the director’s 
leave as well as the date when the director notified his/her decision to leave. There is a pervasive missing 
of the report for non-S&P 500 firms, so this paper finally focuses on S&P 500 firms only. Eventus is used 
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to calculate the abnormal return around the event date, and CRSP data are used to calculate the two-year 
buy-and-hold return of those sample firms. A model based on that designed by DeAngelo et al. (2010) is 
employed to test if those directors selected a favorable market opportunity to evade loss of human capital 
before the bad news became public.  
It is surmised that market would react negatively to outside directors’ departures, but the result from 
the preliminary event study reject this intuitive guess. Going behind the phenomenon by looking at more 
factors and longer window, this paper shows evidence that directors who quit but hide the reason are 
probably sly: they choose a time when stock prices were rising, quit without giving any concrete explanation, 
and run away from the upcoming adverse time. The market timing test model that was developed in this 
paper shows limited support to the timing hypothesis. 
The findings of this paper contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, the evidence raises 
question about the efficiency of outside directors in certain circumstances. The governance literature show 
an increased interest in the recent decade on outside directors as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens the 
oversight role and the independence of the board of directors. While the extant literature generally document 
that the presence of outside directors leads to increased accounting quality, such as more conservative 
earnings (Ahmed and Duellman [2007]), higher accruals quality (Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi [2010]), 
less earnings management (Jaggi, Leung, and Gul [2009]), little caution has been given to the mechanism 
of outside directors. From a behavioral perspective, this paper documents that, like managers, outside 
directors also have individual incentives to entrench themselves when firms are under potential troubles. 
Second, while the literature supports the notion that outside directors are introduced into the boards to 
restrict the production of misleading financial information, this paper documents that outside directors also 
release misleading information for the reasons of their departures, urging researchers, investors, and 
regulators to pay extra attention to the turnovers in the boardrooms. Finally, this paper contributes to the 
recent stream of studies on directors’ turnover. Results of this paper show that while directors’ departure 
predicts firm performance, which is consistent with Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stultz’s (2017) finding, how 
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directors explain the reasons and how fast they want to leave the firms are also informative about firm 
performance. This paper also documents that market-timing opportunities can affect when directors 
announce their decisions of departure, contributing to explain why directors turnover occur before financial 
fraud is discovered, as reported by Gao et al. (2017). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.3 summarizes the literature with regard 
to outside directors and their behaviors. Section 3.4 discusses two recent cases of industry leaders with 
unusual boardroom turnover. Section 3.5 outlines the development of hypotheses and the design of the 
methodology for five research questions. Section 3.6 and 3.7 illustrates the sample and empirical analyses. 
Section 3.8 draws conclusion from the evidence, and Sections 3.9 discusses alternative explanations. 
3.3 Literature Review 
 
As posited by Fama and Jensen (1983) in the conflict between managers and shareholders, the board 
of directors serves as a mechanism of corporate governance to mitigate the agency cost by monitoring the 
agent on behalf of principals. While top executives are also elected to the board and this duality reduces the 
effectiveness of governance, the introduction of outside directors reinforces the role of the board with their 
independence from the management. Since agency theory is heavily based on the monitoring mechanism, 
the theory and a large body of agency-problem literature emphasize the importance of board independence. 
In practice, regulations across economies globally have specific requirements on the independence of board 
compositions. 
However, evidence on the relationship between corporate performance and board independence are 
inconsistent (Choi, Park, and Yoo, 2007). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that each time a firm appointing 
additional outside director its value increases, but Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran (1995), Yermack 
(1996), Klein (1998), and Dalton et al. (1998) ﬁnd no association between the presence of outside directors 
and ﬁrm performance. Nevertheless, Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) explain this inconsistency with 
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their evidence that performance increases with the number of outside directors only when the cost of 
acquiring information is low.  
The effect of board structure on firm performance seems not directly clear, but prior studies from 
accounting side have found an association between independent directors and information qualities. Klein 
(2002) finds that higher proportion of independent director is related to lower level of discretionary accruals. 
Ahmed and Duellamn (2007) find more timely recognition of bad news is related to a higher proportion of 
independent directors. Additionally, Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) document that higher 
proportion of independent directors is associated with more frequent earnings forecast from managers, and 
the forecast is less likely to be optimistically biased. Karmanou and Vafreas (2005) report consistent results. 
Gul and Leung (2004) document that board independence has a positive link with the frequency of voluntary 
disclosures, which contain more comprehensive information as compared to earnings forecast. Since 
corporate disclosure reduces the cost of capital (Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson [1996]; Botosan [1997]; 
Botosan and Plumlee [2000]; Richardson and Welker [2001]), these studies from accounting side help to 
unveil the linkage between board independence and cost of capital. Accordingly, provided that the 
correlation between board independence and disclosure quality and frequency are both positive, losing 
independent directors may result in a decrease of information quality and availability. The decreased 
information then may raise the cost of capital faced by investors (Easley and O’Hara [2004]).  
Apart from the cost of equity aspect, the departure of independent director can hint conflict with 
management or concern of decreasing corporate performance (Dewally and Peck [2010]; Fahlenbrach, Low, 
and Stulz [2017]). Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that outside directors’ motivation to monitor the 
management is their desire to maintain a reputation as ethical business experts and if outside directors find 
it difficult to monitor the management, they are very likely to resign to stay away from any foreseeable 
stigma that can mar their valuable reputations. Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2017) show that outside 
directors tend to leave ahead of troubles proxied by underperformance and restatements, and in their paper, 
Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2017) call this evading behavior the “dark side” of outside directors because 
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they leave when they are most needed. Gilson (1990) documents higher turnover of outside directors for 
financially distressed firms, and Yermack (2004) finds that director turnover is related to firm’s low 
performance. Therefore, it is not prudent to conjecture that the departure of outside directors implies a 
higher possibility of adverse news in the future. However, not all directors give the true reason for their 
decisions to relinquish board positions. 
According to the extant literature of outside directors, the primary reason why a director leaves 
boardroom is the concern of reputation risk associated with negative news and unsatisfied performance. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that preserving and enhancing reputation in the labor market for directorships 
is a primary motivation of directors and that directors want to build a reputation as a diligent monitor of 
management because otherwise it destructively affects the value of their human capital and the likelihood 
of obtaining future directorships. Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that there is a substantial devaluation 
of human capital when directors neglect their monitoring duties. Directors have a strong incentive to 
maintain a good reputation which is the major assets that can secure his/her seats on other boards in the 
future, and the reputation is closely related to the performance of each firm during his/her tenure. If a 
company falls into financial distress (Gilson [1990]), gets acquired (Harford [2003]), underperforms 
(Yermack [2004]), experiences accounting restatements (Srinivasan [2005]), or is sued for financial fraud 
(Fich and Shivdasani [2007]), its directors are more likely to lose directorships of other companies because 
of devalued reputation.  
However, survey results from consulting industry show something different from what we know in the 
literature, namely the foremost importance of reputation. PwC (2009) reports that reputation concern is 
only the third important reason for directors’ resignations, whereas about five times more directors say time 
constraint is the primary reason for resignation than the number of directors say reputation concern is. What 
can be inferred from this survey is that, in reality, the decision of director’s departure can be more attributed 
to time over-commitment than to name protection, resulting in the complexity of true implications for firm 
future performance as the actual reason may or may not be reputation risk associated with potential 
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underperformance or trouble of any type. Besides the fact that time constraint pressures directors to resign, 
the trend of multi-directorship in recent decade has raised a question among researchers and investors on 
busy directors’ workload and distraction caused by over-boarding. Research shows that from 1996 to 2010, 
the number of directorships per person has increased (Bar-Hava et al. [2013]) while the responsibility of 
directors required by regulation has also increased. Bar-Hava et al. (2013) cite from The Wall Street Journal 
(February 29 [2012]) that there is “a substantial increase in the time devoted by directors to a board from 
an annual mean of 150 hours in 2003 to 227 hours in 2011”, which is an increase of 51%. As a result, on 
average a director’s total workload has soared to about double the amount of a decade ago when SOX was 
underway. Linck et al. (2009) confirm this increase in workload with evidence that audit committees meet 
more than twice as often post-SOX as they did pre-SOX, while their evidence also shows that the risk for 
directorships surged as Director and Officer (D&O) insurance increased to more than twice the premium 
of pre-SOX. According to the results of PwC’s 2009 Annual Board of Directors Survey, 29% of directors 
decided or seriously thought about resigning from one of the boards they serve, and 3/8 of the decision or 
deliberation were due to time constraints and 1/4 were due to personal liability and reputational concerns. 
Therefore, it is known as a fact that time constraint is now number one reason for resignation. What is not 
known though is why a director chooses to resign or step down from one firm rather than another firm in 
his/her positions pool. 
In the year of 2012, about 59% of audit committee members are financial expert (Ernst and Young, 
2017), and, from 2012 through 2017, 41% of the audit committee chairs have been changed and the turnover 
of audit committees of the five-year period is astonishingly high at 85% (Ernst and Young, 2017). Among 
those audit committees that had turnovers, 49% of the committee members are newly added. Kachelmeier, 
Rasmussen, and Schmidt (2016) report that 13% of S&P 1500 audit committee members experience 
turnover from the board within two years following the 2007 annual meeting, due to factors such as firm 
performance and ineffective oversight. Gal-Or, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2015) also report an average of 12% 
turnover from 2004 to 2010 among “accounting financial experts” (AFE) in their larger sample.  
50 
 
Although earlier studies suggest a positive association between over-boarding and perceived director 
quality (Gilson [1990]; Kaplan and Reishus [1990]; Shivdasani [1993]; Brickley et al. [1999]), the reality 
of recent decade may not be as optimistic. Ferris et al. (2003) report no relationship between the presence 
of busy directors and performance, and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) report that firms with higher over-
boarding are associated with weaker governance quality and firm performance. Given the phenomenon that 
over-boarding is prevalent across industries and the fact that investors do not like distracted directors 
(Masulis and Mobbs [2011]), it is a rational choice for a director with inadequate time to resign from one 
boardroom to avoid being blamed for unsuccessful monitoring. However, the reason why resigning from 
one particular firm while keeping the positions in other firms has not been addressed. Multi-directorship is 
not only an excuse for resignation due to time constraint, it is actually a catalyst: if all directors serve only 
on the board of one firm, they may not feel as relieved to resign because that means losing all the benefit, 
such as business connection, experience, media presence, and compensation from the sole directorship, but 
busy directors only give up a small proportion of what they obtain from directorships when resigning from 
one firm. 
3.4 Recent cases 
 
Wells Fargo & Company was named the world’s most valued bank brand for the year of 2013 when, 
however, two directors (including one financial expert) announced stepping down whilst the company 
released no expectation of turnovers in 2012. It was actually 9 months after the announced stepping-downs 
that Los Angles Times published an investigation in December of 2013 against the most valued bank of the 
year, and one month after the publishing another director who is also a financial expert resigned in January 
2014 citing health-related reasons after just 13 months of election into the board of Wells Fargo as the chair 
of the audit and examination committee. 
Wells Fargo had an outstanding performance in 2012 with 18.9 billion of net income which was a 19% 
of growth compared to 2011, and the CEO of this bank was named Banker of the Year in 2013 by American 
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Banker in November 2013. “No bank is better run than Wells Fargo, and no bank is better sticking to what 
it does best,” says Euromoney in July 2013. While every outsider recognized Wells Fargo’s excellence in 
the financial industry, two insiders decided to look for opportunities in new boards other than that in Wells 
Fargo. Little suspicion was triggered outside the company and there was virtually no media follow up on 
the two cases of director departure except the company’s proxy statement release. 
Back to as early as 2009 when the bank was recovering its performance from the crisis with an 
ambitious strategy, regional employees started to be stressed by the company’s sales target. Two cases were 
cited by the Los Angles Times publication in which the employees quit Wells Fargo due to unreasonable 
daily sales quota, plus another two lawsuits in 2010 filed by former employees claiming that the bank forced 
them to open unauthorized accounts and failed to pay overtime for evening telemarking. These small cases 
must have been ignored by most outsiders compared to the banks’ performance from 2009 through 2010 
when its stock price tripled and regained its pre-crisis high. The CEO of Wells Fargo conclude that “In 
2010 Wells Fargo saw solid growth in a variety of businesses, with record net income for the full year…”. 
Nonetheless, two independent directors quitted the company in 2009 and another two did so in 2010, such 
proportion of boardroom turnover did not happen even during the crisis. Beginning September 2010, two 
months after the announced early retirement of an outside director, Wells Fargo underperformed S&P 500 
until January 2012 when the company’s revenue growth began. Between 2010 and 2011 while the 
company’s stock had been defeated by peers, Wells Fargo initiated the sales boost program which was cited 
as “pressure cooker” by the Los Angles Times in its 2013 release. Although from February 2009 to April 
2010 Wells Fargo saw a constant recovery from the crisis, three outside directors left from April 2010 
through December 2011, as later we know, prior to the stock underperformance and sales-target conflict. 
The boardroom of Wells Fargo delivered a signal of red flag again from 2012 through 2013. While 
Wells Fargo’s branches had been beating sales targets and the bank presented record revenue, three 
directors decided to quit the boardroom in San Francisco headquarter while none of them said any reason 
about their early retirement until outsiders could infer a little from a media report that lawsuits might be in 
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the wind. By May 2015 when L.A. City Attorney sued Wells Fargo, alleging 'unlawful and fraudulent 
conduct', another two outside directors had departed from the bank. 
This case suggests a signaling effect of directors’ turnovers, especially clustered departures, when a 
company seems doing fine. The even more interesting aspect of Wells Fargo case is that no director left the 
company when its performance was diving, such as during the financial crisis and during the lawsuits and 
regulatory investigations. Since leaving the company when it is among manifest trouble such as 
underperformance or governance issues may affect a director’s reputation by indicating incompetence or 
irresponsibility to guide the company out of trouble, quitting before the trouble emerges is preferred by 
most directors who want to leave with an intact reputation. Although outside directors may be less informed 
than CEO, their access to board meetings enables them to forecast more accurately than analysts and the 
public to take steps in advance. This non-financial action, which is resignation or retirement, secures exactly 
what directors care most: their reputation as human capital (Fama and Jensen [1983]) which is worth the 
compensation of $277.237/year for 2.1 directorships per person multiplied by an average tenure of 8.5 years 
(E&Y [2013]; Spencer Stuart Board Index [2015]; WSJ [2016]), resulting in 4.9 million dollars of expected 
total earnings for being qualified for directorship in S&P 500 companies. On the other hand, the average 
shareholding by an S&P 500 outside director is only 0.57 million dollars on average (Anderson, Mansi, and 
Reeb [2004]; Bhagata and Tookes [2005]; Ahmed and Duellman [2007]; dollar value based on market cap 
as of February 28, 2017) which is about 1/10 of a directors’ reputation value. Therefore, an outside director 
can best protect his/her assets by shifting positions without legal risk rather than trading shares that can be 
subject to latent litigation liabilities.  
Although time constraint, age concern, and personal reasons are usually given as explanations for the 
decision of departure, directors at Wells Fargo seemed not to have such constraint and concerns with other 
firms that they worked with at the time they left Wells Fargo. Among the ten directors who relinquished 
Wells Fargo seats, only two also stepped down from at least one other public companies. Although none of 
them said Wells Fargo had anything leading to their “personal” decisions, their departures only happened 
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in this bank. Of the seven outside directors who retired from Wells Fargo during 2009 through 2016, six 
remained active as outside directors in other public companies, while of the three outside directors who 
resigned from Wells Fargo, two retained their seats in other companies. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Wells Fargo is not the only case in which directors quit without giving concrete reasons, but investors 
see underperformance or legal issues after their departures. A traditional manufacturer that also attracted 
investor’s attention in the past few years was P&G of which the stock price dived for 24% in 2015 after 
year-long unstable fluctuations in 2014. Although the board of P&G seemed peaceful in 2015, the fact 
might be that insiders have already taken steps in 2013 as one insider resigned during a 4-month hike and 
another insider retired during a 6-month rise in stock price. One insider, the CEO of the company, surprised 
investors by resigning from the company after realizing 25% increase in the stock price for the past year of 
his management. There would have been less surprise if the other insider ,who announced his decision to 
retire four months before the CEO resigned, had released some concrete reasons for his departure in January 
2013, but the fact was no reason was given and nothing wrong on the stock market was seen associated 
with his departure. The public didn’t see this anomaly as a red flag as they accepted the explanation of age 
and time concerns, but investors were later astounded by the CEO’s resignation and eventually the diving 
of stock price in 2015. There was a lesson in fact for P&G investors back in 2010. On the 12th of January 
2010, an outside director retired immediately from P&G with the explanation of age concerns after the 
investors gained a 30% return in the past year, but starting from the next month P&G released earnings 
expectations lower than forecasts. P&G stock return was virtually 0% from February 2010 through July 
2012 while S&P 500 increased by 25%. In fact, citing age concern as the reason to retire did not mean this 
is the concern for every directorship in her positions pool, and her position in AT&T was definitely not 
affected by that reason. If P&G investors had just automatically followed this director’s position and 
exchanged all P&G shares into AT&T shares, they would have gained a return of 39% for the same period 
when they gained 0% at P&G where “age” is an issue. 
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[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
These two cases attracted much market-wide attentions in recent years. When out directors quit without 
any negative reason pointing to the companies, there could be something hiding behind the stage. A 
different true story may or may not exist, but ignoring these turnovers in the boardroom is not a wise choice 
for investors according to these cases. To study if there are systematical correlations between independent 
directors’ turnover and stock performance changes, this paper extends the study to S&P 500 companies 
with regard to their out director’s unexpected turnovers in terms of resignation, retirement, or stepping 
down, and statistical tests are designed in Section 3.5 and performed in Section 3.6. 
3.5 Hypotheses and Research Design 
 
An outside director’s unexpected departure such as resignation or early retirement signals that the cost 
- reputational risk which is detrimental to one’s seats on multiple boards - increases. Since directors are 
usually experienced business experts, they are able to differentiate sunk cost from potential cost and 
opportunity cost. Sunk cost is the underperformance or any other type of adverse circumstances of the 
company in the past, and this is not a major factor in the equation of a director’s cost-benefit calculation. 
Therefore this paper does not consider past performance of a company to be strongly informative to a 
director’s departure decision, although past performance can in many cases be continuous and its inertia in 
the future rather than past underperformance itself is the economic reason for a director’s departure. 
Moreover, if an outside director anticipates recovery from underperformance in the following year, he/she 
may choose to stay in the firm for the reason that guiding a troubled firm back on track contributes to one’s 
reputation and experience as a qualified director. In a short summary, past performance of a firm is sunk 
cost to a director and is therefore not directly suggestive of an outside director’s departure decision. What 
leads to resignation is the prospective underperformance as a potential cost that the director foresees in the 
company or time conflict as opportunity cost that the director faces among his/her multiple positions. 
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Besides reputation protection and job preference, directors may also decide to leave a board before the 
end of the term to avoid potential excessive workload or even legal liability in the case of an audit committee 
member. When an outside director foresees business trouble in the future, an increasing amount of work 
can be predicted on various issues such as reviewing new proposed projects, reformatting compensation 
plan, searching for new CEO, monitoring more activities within the company as requested by shareholders, 
and even restructuring the firm’s operation or ownership, but the increased workload will not be 
proportionally compensated. Consequently, a rational decision in front of uncompensated commitment and 
liability is to quit as soon as possible. However, leave a firm’s board may signal bad news to investors who 
discount the firms’ stock price for potential underperformance. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
H1: The announcement of outside director’s departure is taken as negative news to the firm and stock 
return following the announcement is negative. 
In practice, there are mainly three types of director departure: retirement, resignation, and automatic 
stepping down via the annual re-election mechanism. Retirement is usually not a shock to market since it 
could be expected according to the company’s age policy, but considering that investors are not necessarily 
familiar with firm’s retirement policy, retiring could thus be a sort of new information which may not have 
a significant impact on stock price though. Resignation is however unexpected especially when the 
company does not currently have observable trouble. Automatic quit, which means not seeking re-election 
after one year of the mandate, is also an unexpected sort of departure, because directors usually sit on board 
for multiple years (directors’ average tenure is 8.5 years, E&Y [2013]) and are not willing to step down 
unless they have to. Many directors notify the board their intention of not seeking re-election before the 
end of their annual mandates, so this is unexpected information as it can happen at any time in the year. But 
compared with resignation, stepping down is less surprising because it is partly decided by the mechanism. 
Therefore I predict that market is more surprised by resignation than by automatic stepping down than by 
retirement in a negative way. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
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H2: As retirement, stepping down, and resignation cause increasing level of surprise to the market, 
the magnitude of negative return following the three types of leave increases with the level of surprise. 
As for the reasons given for leaving, age concern is the most moderate one, whereas vague reasons such 
as personal choice and time commitment seem less verifiable and forceful. Not giving any reason may raise 
market suspicion, and disagreement with other board members would definitely be a shock to the stock 
price. Hence, the following hypotheses: 
H3: As age concern, personal reason, hiding reason, and disagreement have an increasing level of 
negative implication, the magnitude of negative return following the leave of outside directors increases 
with the level of negative implication. 
Outside investors are usually notable people in business circles, and they care about their reputation as 
valuable human capital. On the one hand, since they are non-executives who do not have direct financial 
interest in the firm, there seems no reason for them to be involved in any adverse situation of the firm. On 
the other hand, outside directors have access to private information as inside directors do, so they know 
before the public where the firm’s performance is going. Therefore, outside directors may want to quit when 
they learn any potential and major drop in performance, as documented by Dewally and Peck (2010) and 
as called by Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) the “dark side” of outside directors. In this sense, I predict that when 
a firm’s outside director leaves, the firms’ operating performance would drop in the current or upcoming 
fiscal year. Since resignation is the most rapid way and stepping down needs to wait, I predict that whether 
a director wants to resign or step down depends on the severity of the anticipated situation. Also, when the 
anticipated performance is more pessimistic, the director is more likely to leave before he/she can find an 
excuse. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
H4: A firm’s net income is negatively related with the suddenness of an outside director’s leave, the 
concealment of the reason for leaving, and the existence of disagreement with the rest of board. 
57 
 
𝑁𝐼𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑁𝐼 + 𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑒 
 NI is the net income of a given fiscal year, Assets and Debts control for the size effect in two ways. 
Prior earnings and the industry’s average earnings capture the relative performance. NI, Assets, and Debt 
are deflated by taking the logarithmic values. Type is assigned to be 1 when a director retires, 2 when a 
director steps down, and 3 when a director resigns. The increasing ordinal number accounts for the 
suddenness of a director’s leave. Dummy Hide indicates if the reason for leave is concealed or given. I 
predict the signs of Type, Hide, and 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑒 to be negative. Cumulative abnormal return before the 
director’s notification of the decision to leave is included to control for possible market timing effect, which 
will be more specifically tested in the next hypothesis. 
 Since directors do not want to quit during a firm’s adverse situation in which case they might be 
questioned, I conjecture that directors time the market to quit in an opportunity that looks good to the firm 
to avoid rumor. On the other hand, a director must leave before stock return goes down. Therefore, a director 
is more likely to notify his/her decision to leave in a month preceded by a month with increasing return and 
succeeded by a month when he/she anticipates the trouble to emerge. The ex-post measurement of stock 
return is used to proxy a director’s anticipation. 
When a director cannot find an excuse for leaving, he/she has to be more careful for the time compared 
to others who have one, so the timing effect is more profound when the reason for leaving is not to be given. 
Gao et al. (2017) document that directors of fraud firms exhibit abnormal turnovers before frauds are 
detected, indicating that directors have the incentive and ability to dissociate themselves from firms before 
market knows the fraud. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
 H5: The probability that an outside director leaves the board is more correlated with stock return 
after the departure announcement when the director is going to hide the reason for leaving. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) use P/B ratio and abnormal stock returns as proxies for market-
timing opportunity to test the relation between firm’s SEO decision and the market-timing opportunity. In 
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their paper, whether a firm issues SEO in a given year is determined by the firm’s current P/B ratio, stock 
performance in the prior year, and stock performance in the next year. They find that a firm’s SEO 
probability is increased when prior stock performance is high and later performance is low, which means 
that firms are more likely to issue equity when their stock prices are rising and before their stock prices fall. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) use the same approach for market timing 
test in equity issuing and repurchase. This paper follows the idea of DeAngelo DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Stulz (2010) to conduct a quantitative test for outside director’s market timing behaviors.  
 An assumption of this paper is that when an outside director plans to quit before some negative 
information is publicly known, he/she can choose from a five-month window to announce the decision of 
leave. This five-month window includes two months before the actual announcement month and two 
months after the actual announcement month, as well as the announcement month itself. Since the two-
month flexibility is discretionary, I also use one-month and three-month flexibility for concern of sensitivity, 
but only the two-month flexibility is used as an example in the following discussion. Although the 
distribution of notification probability within the flexibility window is unknown, I assume that the 
distribution is at least symmetric, because firms face a random walk of stock returns so that the best market 
opportunity should not be skewed to either earlier or later time. This assumption of symmetric distribution 
is why the window includes two months before the notification and two months after the notification. 
 A dummy variable 𝑃𝑟 equals to 1 if director’s decision to leave is notified in a month and 0 if not 
notified in that month. Monthly market-adjusted returns before, during, and after that month are employed 
as predictors. Monthly returns are interacted with the dummy of hiding reason because, as discussed 
before, the timing effect is predicted to be more profound for directors who do not have an excuse. 
𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 1)𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝑹 + 𝜸𝑹 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑒 
𝑹 = (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡,  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡+1, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡+2, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡+3)
𝑇 
𝜷 = (𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝛽5) 
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𝜸 = (𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛾3, 𝛾4, 𝛾5) 
 For t-1 and t, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are predicted to be positive because higher previous and current stock return 
means better market opportunity; for t+2 and t+3, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are predicted to be negative because lower 
approaching stock return means it might be the last chance now. The prediction for t+1 is neutral as there 
are two possibilities: if the director is really ahead of time, month t+1 is not yet the adverse month, but if 
the director has waited until the last chance, t+1 is then the turning point. My prediction for the signs of 
interaction terms are same as those of monthly returns, because signs in the same direction mean that 
director who do not have an excuse are more sensitive to market timing opportunities. 
3.6 Sample and Results 
 
RiskMetrics is the database to obtain a list of outside directors who are recorded in the in a given year 
but not in the year after. These directors are considered to have left the company, so their names are then 
searched on Factiva New Database to confirm that these directors did quit the boards and to trace the details 
such as when and why they left the boards. There are three types of leave: retirement, resignation, and not 
seeking re-election. As for the reasons being given for leave, there are three groups: age, personal reason, 
disagreement with the board and other kinds of obvious trouble, and giving any reason is treated as the 
fourth group. Accounting data are retrieved from Compustat and return data are from CRSP. Eventus is 
employed to calculate abnormal return around the event dates. 
 The final sample covers 231 directors from 145 firms of which all are in the S&P 500 index, and 
the sample period is from 2009 to 2012. Of this sample, 88 of them retired, 57 of them would not stand for 
re-election, and 86 of them resigned. Table 8 provides the distribution of the reasons for leaving. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
[insert Table 9 about here] 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
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3.6.1 Abnormal return around the news of director’s decision to leave, whole sample 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the CAR around director’s notification of the decision of leave is positive. 
The stock price before six days of the event is relatively normal, but it starts to increase since day -5 and 
keeps the trend till day 27. In Table 11 which gives the significance level of several windows, the CAR is 
significant in both most pre-event and post-event windows except for the window of (0, +5). However, 
since the post-event inertia lasts for nearly 30 days, it is not likely that the abnormal return is caused by the 
event. Rather, it might be that the event happens to be during a time when the stock return is continuously 
rising. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
3.6.2 Abnormal return around the news of director’s decision to leave, subsamples with respect 
to type of leave 
 
Figure 6 shows the abnormal returns of the retirement group, the stepping-down group, and the 
resignation group. Although there is a separation of the three of curves, the trend remains unchanged. Stock 
performance goes up regardless of the type of a director’s leaving. Moreover, there are two noteworthy 
facts: resignation is preceded by a small drop around 10 days ahead of the event, and the event day of 
stepping down is succeeded by a drop after 20 days, indicating differences may exist between the two 
groups.  
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
Patell Z test in Table 12 shows that the pre-event abnormal return for the resignation group is not 
significant, whereas post-event abnormal return for the retirement group is not significant. The retirement 
group has a longer significant post-event window, and the stepping-down group has a shorter significant 
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post-event group. From an overall point of view, the significance of abnormal return is substantially reduced 
after separating the sample by the type of leaving. 
3.6.3 Abnormal return around the news of director’s decision to leave, subsamples with respect 
to the reason of leave. 
 
A difference can be observed when separating the sample by the reasons of leaving. In Figure 7, 
directors who have a disagreement and other kinds of troubles show a curve that is consistent with this 
paper’s prediction. Leaving for age concern and other personal reasons maintain their increasing trends at 
different speeds though. However, the group with hidden reason seems to have a story to say: the graph 
suggests that the hidden reason might be unveiled 20 days later as a drop in the stock returns begins to 
emerge. 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
3.6.4 Buy-and hold return before and after the event, whole sample 
 
I follow these firms’ 2-year buy-and-hold return using S&P 500 portfolio as a benchmark, and the long-
run performance of these firms seems to suggest that directors who left the firm had already anticipated 
some unfavorable situation. Figure 8 shows that the directors notify their intention to quit during when the 
firm’s monthly return has been climbing, and the long-run stock return from the 10th month afterward drops 
dramatically. I consider this change in long-run monthly return as evidence that directors leave before the 
adverse situation in the firms, which is consistent with my observation in short run for the concealment 
group. Patell Z test and Sign Z from Table 14 show limited and weak support for the significance of the 
graphed returns though.  
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
62 
 
3.6.5 Buy-and-hold return before and after the event, subsamples by type of leave 
 
According to the evolution of monthly return in Figure 9, those who resign are tactful as they quit in a 
time that is just right. These directors resign during the firm’s best time, and it seems that they must be 
leaving for really personal concerns and their leaving has nothing to do with the firm, but the truth might 
be that dark is rising and they have fled ahead of time. On the other hand, those who retire and step down 
do not show the pattern of pre-notification rise and post-notification drop. Significance test in Table 15 
reinforces implications of the different patterns. 
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
3.6.6. Buy-and-hold return before and after the event, subsamples by reasons of leave 
 
As for the effect of reasons being given for the departures, those who do not even give the reason have 
left the firms just in time as shown in Figure 10. They notify their decision to leave right at the end of a 
hiking interval, and the post-notification stock return seems not too bad, but one year later the real problem 
appears and stock return goes down continuously. Significance test in Table 16 provides weak for this 
hypothesis support though. 
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
3.6.7 Results: operating performance 
 
In line with Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2017) argument, firm’s operation performance can be implied 
by outside director’s departure. Linear regression for these 145 firms’ performance after outside director’s 
departure shows that hiding the reason for leave has significantly negative implication on firms’ recent 
earnings (both year t and year t+1). Three specifications are presented in Table 17. The type of leaving 
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significantly affects firm’s next-year but not current-year net income. Whether a director hides his/her 
reason for leaving also matters: concealment of the reason significantly (coeffecient=-0.4176; t=-3.45; 
P<0.01) indicates less net income in the next year, although such concealment weakly (coeffecient=0.1219; 
t=1.68; P<0.10) indicates higher net income in the current year. However, when a director resigns and hides 
the reason (Type*Hide), the company’s net income in the next year is higher (coefficient=0.2210; t=4.11; 
P<0.01). This is against my prediction that the combined effect of resignation and concealment indicates 
underperformance in the following year. 
[Insert Table 17 about here] 
3.6.8 Results: market timing test 
 
Following DeAngelo et al.’s (2010) approach, the logistic regression for the probability that a director 
leaves in a given month uses monthly stock returns around that given month as independent variables. It is 
predicted that the signs of pre-event and of-event returns are positive and show that directors have a better 
opportunity to leave when the stock has been going up, and it is also predicted that the signs of post-event 
returns are negative and show that directors are more likely to leave when they anticipate dark to be rising. 
The dummy for concealment of reason measures its additional effect on the director’s market timing 
behavior. It is hypothesized that directors who do not have an excuse would be more sensitive to market-
timing opportunity, so the signs for interaction terms are predicted to be same as those of each 
corresponding monthly returns. 
[Insert Table 18 about here] 
Table 18 presents the results of the logistic test. As predicted, a monthly return in the first post-event 
month (month t+1) is negatively related with the probability that a director notifies his/her intention to leave. 
Monthly return in the second post-event month (month t+2) is not in line with my prediction. Results are 
similar across assumptions on different flexibility windows from ±1 to ±3. 
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The interaction terms represent whether directors are timing the market more sensitively when they 
plan to leave without given an explanation. The coefficient of 5.05 (t=3.04) for Hide*Return(t-1) means 
that when a director plans to leave without an excuse, he/she is more likely to announce the decision after 
a month of positive stock return, but the significance level is weak (10%) and the conclusion holds only on 
the assumption that he/she has ± two months flexibility to notify the decision. The coefficient of 
Hide*Return(t) is negative and opposite to my prediction, regardless of assumption on flexibility window. 
The positive signs of coefficients of Hide*Return(t+1) are acceptable because it means that directors prefer 
to announce their decisions during a longer increasing period than doing so until the last chance. The 
coefficient of -10.04 (t=4.55) for Hide*Return(t+2) supports my hypothesis that directors who do not have 
an excuse for leaving are more likely to notify their decisions before performance decline is starting, but 
this conclusion holds only for the assumption of ±1 month flexibility. Generally, the market timing 
hypothesis receives limited evidence. 
3.7 Conclusion and Summary 
 
 The prediction that market negatively reacts to all kinds of leave of outside directors is rejected. 
This finding is surprising but interesting, and it enhances the motivations of the next steps. After the sample 
is separated by different dimensions, results suggest that the type of leave does not matter, but what matters 
is the reason being given for the decision of leave. Directors who leave without giving a reason are tactful: 
they notify their intention to leave when the firms are doing well in the stock market, but the stock prices 
coincidently begin to fall after they have left. 
The long-run study shows a similar trend. After about 12 months following directors’ resignation, firm 
value declines dramatically, and after about 10 months following directors’ leaving without explanation, 
the firm value drops continuously. The regression analysis shows that the suddenness of director’s leave is 
negatively related with firm’s current- and next- year accounting earnings, and the concealment of the 
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reason for leave indicates 0.7 billion dollar decrease in current-year earnings and more than 3 billion dollar 
decrease in next-year earnings. 
Limited evidence is documented for market timing behavior of outside directors. Generally speaking, 
there is moderate evidence for market timing in months that are relatively far from (both before and after) 
the event time, but there are also mixed evidence in months that are close to the event time. However, the 
mixed evidence can be reasonable, because some directors may take actions earlier and some may take 
actions later, so the aggregated effect around the event time could be mixed up. 
To summarize, the findings of this paper suggest that investors should be alerted by outside directors’ 
turnovers, especially when the departure is not well founded. As for regulators, evidence from this paper 
suggests that increased disclosure for directors’ turnover could be imposed to reduce investors’ information 
disadvantage. Moreover, mechanisms that can protect directors from reputational losses subsequent to firm 
underperformance should be established to discourage directors from shirking their responsibilities. Jiang, 
Wan, and Zhang (2015) document that the Chinese mandatory disclosure rule on directors’ voting record 
rewards directors dissenting with proposals with more directorships and lower risk of regulatory sanctions 
as their effort to protect investors’ interest are publicly known. However, the voting record is not publicly 
disclosed in the United States. As a result, when a firm is underperforming, investors cannot observe 
directors’ effort but only see a company’s underperformance during the directors’ tenure. 
3.8 Discussion of alternative aspects 
 
 One alternative explanation for the decline of long-run performance is that a qualified director’s 
departure from the board results in lower governance quality which is later reflected in the stock and 
operating performance. Nonetheless, the new director’s competence is not expected to be skewed to the 
lower side and the leaving director’s competence is not expected to be skewed to the higher side either, so 
even if there are differences in directors’ qualification, the change is random and the pooled sample should 
not present systematic lower qualification of new directors compared to the leaving directors. 
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 However, actually 585 outside directors are originally figured as leaving directors by sorting out 
RiskMetrics data, but only 231 of them have been found in Factiva News Database. The 50% reduction and 
the resulted gap are non-ignorable. It is possible that only big firms receive extensive media coverage and 
the sample of this paper is biased to industry leaders. If this is the case, it might be true that director for the 
giant firms are not easy to find and a veteran with the same qualification is not immediately available. The 
firm, if not lucky enough, hence has to either wait for a longer time with the position being left vacant or 
invite someone who is busy on other positions. Consequently, the reduced governance quality due to the 
vacant position or busy director could be a valid reason for the decline of the performance captured by this 
paper. However, with the magnitude of performance changes in the findings being considered: it is not 
likely that a vacant position of outside director or a new busy outside director can result in a total reverse 




Chapter 4  
 





 In a tender offer, the bidder contacts shareholders of a target firm directly by announcing a public 
offer. Insiders typically have a better appreciation of the likelihood and valuation of a successful acquisition 
than outsiders, who have limited access to strategic and private information. This paper shows that using 
pre-announcement stock returns as a hint of insiders’ judgment, an investor can take advantage of insiders’ 
private information reflected in stock prices to earn abnormal return up to 1.82% in a period of only 10 
trading days prior to the expiration of the tender offer. Information inferred from pre-announcement return 
reduces outsider’s disadvantage and protects outsider’s wealth when public disclosure is limited during the 




Takeovers are one of the most researched topics in finance (Holmstrom and Kaplan [2001]; Betton 
Eckbo, and Thorburn [2008]). In a takeover bid, investors’ risk arises from the possibility of the deal failing 
to go through, and due to the risk, or that the possibility of the deal being successful is lower than 100 
percent, the stock price of the target is usually below the offered price during the offer period. Risks 
typically derive from the failure to obtain the requisite shareholder approval or failure to receive antitrust 
and regulatory clearances. 
After a tender offer, the trading volume increases dramatically and arbitrageurs take long positions in 
the target stock (Cornelli and Li [2002]), and the substantial increase in stock return provides a tempting 
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trading opportunity to corporate insiders (Agrawal and Nasser [2012]) and other informed investors (Ashraf 
and Jayaraman [2007]; Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov [2009]; Campbell, Ramadorai, and Shwartz [2009]; 
Daouk and Li [2011]). Larcker and Lys (1987) find that arbitrageurs are able to acquire private information 
to infer merger success before the public information is released, and by doing so risk arbitrageurs earn 
substantial returns. Hsieh and Walking (2005) document that the increased number of arbitrageurs has a 
positive implication on the probability of offer success, indicating that risk arbitrageurs have superior 
information about the results of deals. “Through the actions of the arbitrageur it is possible to……infer the 
probability that an acquisition will ultimately take place……the market can nonetheless be useful in helping 
to assess the resolution of an uncertain acquisition.” (Brown and Raymond, 1986). These studies make 
evident that arbitrageurs are in an advantageous information position where they can foresee whether a deal 
is going to be successful or not. 
Since studies assert that arbitrageurs have private information about deal result and a substantial part 
of price change around merger announcement is due to price pressure caused by arbitrage demand (Mitchell, 
Pulvino, and Stafford, 2004), it can be inferred that arbitrageurs’ advantageous information on deal result 
can be reflected in stock prices through their informed trading when the conclusion day is approaching. 
From an angle without looking at the arbitrageurs, Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986) investigate the price 
movements as indicators of tender offer’s success. They find that a larger increase of relative stock price 
leads to a greater chance of tender offer success. This is consistent with arbitrage studies that informed 
investors can correctly predict takeover result and incorporate their predictions into stock prices by trading. 
Provided that stock prices move as informed investors are trading, uninformed investors do not need 
to gamble and wait to earn profit from bidders. A simpler strategy to buy target stocks several days before 
offer expiration and sell them right before expiration regardless of the deal results can also make a positive 
return. A similar route has been found for stock repurchase offer by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990). 
They report more than 9 percent of abnormal return can be earned over a period shorter than one week prior 
to offer expiration. To capture the pre-expiration profit, the question is, nevertheless, how can we know 
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which target’s price is going to rise (or rise more) if we do not assess the possibility of success? Now that 
the movement of stock price in offer period is affected by arbitrageurs and other informed investors’ trading 
activities, we might be able to predict the movement by detecting other aspects of insider information, e.g. 
insider trading before the public announcement. While institutional factors determine largely the country-
level information asymmetry (Hope [2003]; Ball, Kothari, and Robin [2003];  Bushman [2004]), firm-
specific factors also affect each firm’s information disclosure and transparency (Abdooy and Lev [2000]; 
Hope [2003]). This paper argues that trading based on private information has firm-specific magnitude and 
stock returns caused by such informed trading have a pattern that can be captured to infer private 
information and protect outside investors from being exploited by insiders. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.3 reviews that institutional background 
and the literature pertaining to takeover offers. Section 4.4 develops the hypothesis of how to infer the pre-
event insider information and take advantage of this inferred knowledge to make avprofit. Section 4.5 
presents empirical tests with historical data to examine the hypotheses. Finally, the conclusive summary is 
presented in Section 4.6. 
4.3 Literature reviews 
 
4.3.1 The disclosure in mergers and acquisitions 
 
The disclosure literature on mergers and acquisitions mainly focuses on how bidders convey acquisition 
decisions to investors to justify the rationale of the proposed merger. Kimbrough and Louis (2011) cite the 
argument made by former president of Goldman Sachs, Wayne Moore, that “It is critical that the 
announcement of a transaction be well received and that the bidder’s stock reacts favorably. As a result, 
the time, effort, and care that goes into announcing a deal has increased significantly. And the content—
the description of the strategic rationale and the quantification of the synergies and future earnings 
effects—has as well.” Kimbrough and Louis (2011) conclude that effectively communicating a merger plan 
to investors involves disclosing specific and verifiable details about the integration plans, financial 
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projections including whether the merger is accretive or dilutive to earnings, the management team type, 
key assumptions underlying the anticipated success, and the basis for the purchase price. Conference calls 
and press releases are the main channels of information disclosure. While the firms typically announce their 
acquisitions through press releases, conference calls convey more details and are more informative 
(Kimbrough and Louis [2011]).  
Significant stock price run-ups for target firms in the week preceding takeover announcements have been 
documented since Keown and Pinkerton (1981), and Arshadi and Essell (1993) report cumulative abnormal 
returns ranging from 14.04 to 32.35% over the pre-announcement period. Two explanations for the pre-
announcement run-ups have been widely discussed and tested. The first explanation is that stock price run-
ups reflect investors’ anticipation of the takeover based on press releases and mandated disclosures (Gupta 
and Misra [1989]; Jarrell and Poulsen [1989]; Pound and Zeckhauser [1990]; Sanders and Zdanowicz 
[1992]). The second explanation is that price run-ups are driven by the trading of insiders who have private 
information about the acquisition and the information leakage from the insiders’ trading (Keown and 
Pinkerton [1981]; Meulbroek [1992]; Arshadi and Eyssell [1993]). SEC requires the filing of Schedule 13D 
by anyone who acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of any class of publicly traded securities in 
a public company.  The acquisition or disposition of 1% or more of the class of securities is the subject of 
the filing. Insider trading is regulated, but it does exist (Collin-Dufresne and Fos [2015]). 
4.3.2 informed trading in pre-announcement period 
 
The extant literature documents that insider trading in pre-announcement period lead to and is reflected in 
pre-announcement stock price run-ups (Jarrell and Poulsen [1989]; Arshadi and Eyssell [1993]; Cornell and 
Sirri [1992]; Meulbroeck [1992]; Sanders and Zdanowicz [1992]; Barclay and Warner [1993]; Schwert 
[1996]; King [2009]). Bodnaruk, Massa, Simonov (2009) report that investment banks take positions in the 
targets before M&A announcements either directly or through affiliated financial entities. Griffin, Shu, and 
Topaloglu (2012) document that wealthy individuals (i.e., those trading via full-service brokerages) buy 
target stocks before takeover announcements. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) explore the trading of 
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independent long-term institutions (ILTIs) and report that ILTIs reduce their stakes in advance of the worst 
(bottom quintile) acquisition announcements and increase their stakes in advance of acquisitions with 
positive announcement returns. Agrawal and Nasser (2012) find that insiders increase net purchase before 
takeover announcements, and their net purchases are more pronounced in sub-samples with less uncertainty 
about takeover completion, such as friendly deals, deals of less regulated targets, or deals with a single 
bidder. Chan, Ge, and Lin (2015) document that informed option trading during pre-announcement period 
predicts post-announcement returns, and that informed option holders trade more actively than stock 
investors before M&A announcements. Augustin, Brenner, and Subrahmanyam (2015) also report that 
abnormal options trading volume for both target and acquirer is pronounced prior to M&A announcements. 
Barraclough et al. (2012) exploit the join information set of stock and option prices and document that the 
increase in trading volume from the pre-announcement period to the announcement day is most dramatic 
for target call options. 
4.3.3 The information-learning literature 
 
Hayek(1945)’s theory provides a base premise that financial markets collect the private information and 
beliefs of many different people who trade in firms’ securities and hence provide an efficient mechanism 
for information production and aggregation. The aggregation of information occurs through the trading that 
transmits knowledge of traders(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Based on this fundamental theory, studies in 
the financial literature mainly focus on that managers can learn from the information in stock prices about 
the prospects of their firms since Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) bring the 
theory into corporate finance. Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) study the learning during M&As but do not find 
supporting evidence for the occurrence of learning. They investigate the relationship between the bidder’s 
stock return around the initial M&A announcement and the bidder’s later closing or revision decisions but 
do not find any consistent association. They conclude that managers of the bidders are under the influence 
of hubris which obliterate the incentive to learn from investors’ reactions. Dye and Sridhar (2002) point out 
the two-way information flows between capital market and firms with the comment that information need 
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not “be just from firms to capital markets (as recognized in the extant literature), but also be from capital 
markets to firms.” 
Luo (2005) revisits bidder’s learning process and outcomes. Evidence reported in this paper shows that 
negative bidder stock returns following initial bid announcements increase the chance of subsequent bid 
withdrawal. Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) argue that “Many economic agents take corrective actions 
based on information inferred from market prices of firms’ securities”, and a theoretical connection between 
information inferred from market prices and reactions of economic agents is established in their paper. 
From the empirical perspective, managers are documented to learn from market to revise corporate 
investments (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang 2007; Bakke and Whited 2010). Foucault and Gehrig (2008) 
extend this learning process to an international perspective by documenting that cross-listed firms learn 
from global investors about growth opportunities, and Foucault and Frésard (2012) report cross-listed firms 
learn from international investors about investment efficiencies. Kau, Linck and Rubin (2008) also report 
that managers listen to the market to consummate or discontinue announcement investment projects. As 
Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) do not only discuss manager’s learning process, Paul (2007) 
contributes to the literature with evidence that independent board members also take corrective measures 
when the market reacts negatively to firms’ acquisition bids. Loureiro and Taboada (2015). 
4.4 Hypothesis Development 
 
To illustrate my analysis, I suppose a scenario where bidder’s offer price is 𝑲𝒊 dollars per share of 
firm 𝒊. In day t that is before the conclusion comes out, investors’ estimation of the probability of deal 
being successful is 𝝆𝒊𝒕, and the uncertainty of this probability is 𝛔𝒊𝒕
𝟐 (I use the squared form to guarantee 
constant positive sign of uncertainty). Assuming expected utility maximization and risk aversion, the 
price that investors want to pay for firm 𝒊 in day t increases with 𝝆𝒊𝒕 and decreases with 𝛔𝒊𝒕
𝟐. To simplify 
the mathematics, I adopt linear form to express 𝐏𝒊𝒕 which is the price that investors are willing to pay for 
firm 𝒊 in day t as: 
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𝐏𝒊𝒕 = 𝑲𝒊 ∗ 𝝆𝒊𝒕 − 𝜸 ∗ 𝛔𝒊𝒕
𝟐 
(𝛾 is investors’ average risk-aversion parameter and 𝜸 > 0) 
𝑲𝒊 is locked by the offer, whilst both 𝝆𝒊𝒕 and 𝛔𝒊𝒕
𝟐 are conditional on the status of insider information 
in day t. The content of private information affects the probability 𝝆𝒊𝒕, whereas the quantity and quality of 
private information (hereafter the level of inside information, noted as 𝑰𝒊𝒕 for firm 𝒊 in day t) determines the 









< 𝟎, because the level of private information does not affect the 
expectation, but the uncertainty decreases with the level of private information. 










> 𝟎, which means that target price increases with the quality and 
quantity of inside information. The economic implication of this inequality is that when investors have 
more private information, the uncertainty becomes lower and he is thus willing to pay more for target stock 
because of the reduced risk. 













> 𝟎. The economic implication of this inequality is that the closer to expiration 
day, the less risk there is, and the higher price insiders are willing to pay for target shares.  
So far we have not considered the content, or say the direction, of private information that changes the 
anticipated probability 𝝆𝒊𝒕. Since the direction of private information does not have fixed correlation with 
time t, we assume the expectation of change in 𝝆𝒊𝒕 is zero, which means with a large sample the average 
stock price only moves with the gradually reduced uncertainty 𝛔𝒊𝒕
𝟐, but the random changes of individual 
firms’ probability 𝝆𝒊𝒕 are offset by each other. 




Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) documented that it is possible to earn a profit by purchasing target 
stock as long as the price is lower than the stock repurchase offer price. Similarly, an investor could make 
money simply by joining in the game before tender offer expiration day, as there is a systematic move up 
of stock prices. However, I think that pre-expiration profit can be predicted more precisely, and 
concentrating investment in the most valuable stocks can generate abnormal returns above average. I resort 
to the proxy of insider information to distinguish targets with higher potentials from those with lower. 
Insiders are probably always insiders throughout the deal, and firms with characteristics of a greater 
level of private information probably remain so throughout the deal, so if we can measure the level of 
private information in phases other than the pre-expiration period, we might be able to infer the level of 
private information in the pre-expiration period. Higher level of private information means greater 
reduction of uncertainty 𝛔𝒊𝒕
𝟐 and thus larger increase of stock price 𝐏𝒊𝒕, according to my early discussion 
on the relation between 𝐏𝒊𝒕 and 𝛔𝒊𝒕
𝟐. 
We go back to pre-announcement time when only insiders know about the offer in advance. A series 
of paper link private information to stock price run-up in pre-announcement period. By studying the daily 
stock price movements, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find that the abnormal returns observed prior to the 
announcement of 194 mergers were due to trading on private information. Barclay and Warner (1993) 
document that price movements in pre-announcement period are results of trading by well-informed 
investors, and Chakravarty (2001) report that these informed investors and institutions. Golbe and Schranz 
(1994) show that bidding firms have an incentive to tip arbitrageurs with private information prior to public 
announcement of the tender offer, so the stock return prior to public announcement can reflect private 
information obtained from bidding firms. Arshadi and Eyssell (1993) suggest with evidence that pre-
announcement run-ups are largely due to trading by SEC-registered insiders. Meulbroek (1992) analyzes 
illegal insider trading cases detected and prosecuted by SEC and finds that as large as 44% of the pre-bid 
price run-ups occurred on insider trading days. 
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Therefore, we can use pre-announcement abnormal returns as an indicator of the degree of private 
information. Higher pre-announcement abnormal return indicates a greater level of private information with 
the firm and the insider trading on the firm, and a greater level of private information means a larger 
reduction of uncertainty and thus larger inflation of stock price during the pre-expiration period. The caution, 
however, is that we have to assume constant probability to access private information for each firm 
throughout the deal: the higher (lower) chance of private information in pre-announcement time is 
succeeded by higher (lower) chance of private information in pre-expiration time.  
H2a: Targets with greater pre-announcement run-ups also have greater pre-expiration returns. 
 The purpose in this study is to use ex ante measurements to infer the pre-expiration returns, because 
we are thus able to propose an investment strategy based on ex-ante predictors to capture the pre-expiration 
returns without knowing the ex-post deal results, although the return is mainly determined by whether the 
deal is going to be successful or not. 
 H2b: Purchasing targets with higher pre-announcement run-ups can earn greater abnormal 
return than purchasing targets with lower pre-announcement run-ups can. 
4.5 Data and Research Design 
 
In order to have an obvious conclusion day, this paper needs to focus on targets received tender offers 
which means the deal result is known on expiration day of the offer. Therefore I use SDC Platinum to 
retrieve successful merger and acquisition deals that use tender offer as bidding method. The targets must 
be public firms as we study their abnormal returns. I focus on US market from the beginning of 2000 
through the end of 2012. Under these selection criteria, the final sample includes 547 firms. Eventus is 
employed to estimate each firm’s alpha and beta in a period between 46 days before the announcement to 
up to 263 days backward, and each firm’s alpha and beta estimated by Eventus are used to calculate pre-
announcement and pre-expiration abnormal returns with daily return data from CRSP. 
Specifically, the market model is adopted to calculate the abnormal return of each firm: 
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𝑨𝑹𝒊 = 𝑹𝒊 − 𝜶𝒊 − 𝜷𝒊 ∗ 𝑹𝒎 
The association between the abnormal returns from two pre-event periods is tested by the model 
below: 
𝑷𝒓𝒆_𝑬𝒙𝒑_𝑪𝑨𝑹 = 𝑷𝒓𝒆_𝑨𝒏𝒄_𝑪𝑨𝑹 + 𝑪𝒂𝒔𝒉𝑷𝒂𝒚 + 𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒍𝒚 + 𝑯𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒛𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍 + 𝑳𝒏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 
The dependent variable 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝐶𝐴𝑅  is pre-expiration cumulative abnormal return, and the first 
independent variable 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐴𝑛𝑐_𝐶𝐴𝑅  is pre-announcement cumulative abnormal return. The method of 
payment is controlled by 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑃𝑎𝑦 which equals to 1 if payment includes cash only and 0 otherwise, deal 
attitude is controlled by 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑦 , target’s size is controlled by its market value 4 weeks before 
announcement as 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, and industrial classification is controlled by 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 which equals to 1 if 
bidder and target’s SIC codes are same in the first two digits.  
Although the anticipated possibility of deal being able to go through is a major determinant of pre-
expiration stock price and deal result seems a convenient ex-post proxy for the probability, whether the deal 
turns out successful or not is not controlled because this paper performs an ex-ante study which sticks to 
the fact that the result is unknown at the moment. The post-announcement return is not controlled either, 
because some firms have a very short length of the offer period and there is potential overlap between post-
announcement and pre-expiration periods. 
I predict a positive sign for 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐴𝑛𝑐_𝐶𝐴𝑅 as support for my hypothesis that higher level of inside 
information reflected in pre-announcement return indicates higher pre-expiration return. I expect 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑃𝑎𝑦 
to have a negative sign because cash deals involve less uncertainty and private information thus have lower 
influence. Similarly, I conjecture that 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑦 has negative sign because when the deal is more likely to 
go through due to the friendly attitude, there is less uncertainty and therefore less impact by private 
information. 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 is expected to function  in a similar logic and thus have however a positive sign: 
when the merger is horizontal, uncertainty increases because concern about anti-trust investigation rises 
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and private information is therefore more influential. I predict 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 has a negative sign because larger 
firms are not as easy as smaler firm to probe for private information. 
4.6 Results 
 
 I first present cumulative abnormal return around announcement for all targets in Figure 11. The 
result from the graph shows that stock returns begin to rise gradually since around 30 days prior to the 
announcement. Keown and John M. Pinkerton (1981) documented with data from 1975 to 1978 that insider 
trading problem is more serious since 12 days before the announcement. One possible explanation for the 
difference between their finding and my Figure 11 is that as regulation becomes more severe, insiders have 
to spread their trades into a much wider time span. This is consistent with Kyle’s (1985) finding that 
informed investors are more likely to camouflage their information by spreading trades over time. 
 The graph shows a very typical pattern of merger and acquisition: abnormal return suddenly rockets 
at day -1 relative to the public announcement. Therefore I consider abnormal returns prior to day -1 as 
results of insider information whereas abnormal returns in and after day -1 as results of public information. 
Private information drives the abnormal return up for around 1/3 of that driven by public information. 
[Insert Figure 11 about here] 
[Insert Table 19 about here] 
Cumulative abnormal returns prior to the offer expiration are presented in Figure 12. The graph shows 
that positive abnormal return begins to emerge since 13 days before offer expiration day. I select 3 windows 
to conduct significance test in Table 2. Although the abnormal returns in holding periods are only up to 
1.86%, the annualized return, however, can be dozens of them because the longest window is just 15 trading 
days. Consistent with my prediction, these abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant. The 
results fully support my first hypothesis that as expiration day is approaching, target stock return in general 
increases. 
[Insert Figure 12 about here] 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 I then perform OLS regression for the second hypothesis regarding the association between pre-
announcement return and pre-expiration return. Table 21 provides a description of the sample and variables 
before the regression is presented. Most deals are offered by cash only, and most deals receive friendly 
attitude from target management. Industrial classification is approximately 4 horizontal to 6 vertical and 
conglomerate. Size of the target does not seem skewed. 
[Insert Table 21 about here] 
 Regression results in Table 22 support the second hypothesis that higher pre-announcement return 
precedes higher pre-expiration return. Throughout the 3 specifications with respect to the different selection 
of pre-announcement windows, the sign remains positive and significance level remains at 1%. However, 
the predictions for control variables are neither significant. Although I think the control variables affect 
uncertainty that discounts price, the results do not suggest so. I also performed regression for pre-expiration 
windows of (-10,0) and (-5,0) for sensitivity concern, and results in terms of significance and sign are same 
to those in Table 4, so I do not present them in the paper. 
[Insert Table 22 about here] 
 Given that the regression in specification (3) has the highest R square, overall F test, as well as t 
value for pre-announcement CAR, I use the pre-announcement CAR in window (-10,-2) relative to the 
announcement to sort the sample firms. I call the group in the lowest quartile as “low insider information 
group” and the group in the highest quartile as “high insider information group”, and I present the pre-
expiration cumulative abnormal return of the two groups in Figure 13. 
[Insert Figure 13 about Here] 
Figure 13 suggests that the abnormal returns of the two groups begin to move apart from each other 
since 10 days before offer expiration day. T-test and independent-samples test in Table 23 show that the 
15-day abnormal returns, prior to expiration, of the high-insider-information group and the low-insider-
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information group are significantly different from each other, and the significance level decreases from 1% 
to 5% to 10% as the window shrinks from 15 days to 10 days to 5 days prior to expiration. 
[Insert Table 23 about Here] 
As for the abnormal returns of each group, only the high-insider-information group has significantly 
positive pre-expiration CAR. High-insider-information group in window (-10,0) has the greatest abnormal 
return and significance level. Accordingly, if an investor purchases the stocks of the high-insider-
information group at 10 days prior to offer expiration, she can earn 1.82% in a 10-day period. However, if 
an investor purchases the stocks of the low-insider-information group no matter in which day, she is 




 This paper finds evidence that, in accordance with prior research, stock returns increase gradually 
prior to expiration day. According to a theoretical analysis, the increase is possibly due to reduced 
uncertainty resulted from increased private information. I consider firms associated with higher level of 
private information leakage maintain this feature throughout the deal due to firm-level factors, and I also 
assume informed investors following the deal can obtain private information throughout the deal. As a 
result, there is a significantly positive relation between pre-announcement return and pre-expiration return, 
of which both are prior to the release of public information and both are driven by private information. 
Supposing a situation that uninformed investors have observed targets’ pre-announcement returns and want 
to take a position during the tender offer period whereas they do not have superior information to predict 
deal results, simply by purchasing the high-pre-announcement-return stocks at 10 days before offer 
expiration they can earn 1.82% in 99% chances.  
This study proposes and finds evidence that positive abnormal return exists in the pre-expiration period, 
while the extensive M&A literature studies the return around offer announcement only. A tactic is also 
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developed as using stock return in stage 1 to infer the constant level of private information which can predict 
the stock return in stage 2. Without having to have access to the content itself of private information, an 
uninformed investor can take a free ride simply because of the private information reflected in stock returns 
by insiders’ trading prior to public announcement. 
To summarize, the current disclosure regulations have a very limited effect on reducing information 
asymmetry during acquisitions, outsiders and small investors are at a severe information disadvantage 
during such corporate activities. With the given regulatory reality, this paper examines if outsiders can rely 
on alternative public information to infer what they do not have access to. By examining abnormal returns 
around tender announcements and offer closures, this study presents evidence that insider information is 
reflected in abnormal returns and outside investors can capture such inferred information to mitigate their 
disadvantageous position. Since disclosure regulations have not required effective ways to reduce 
information asymmetry during tender offer periods, I suggest that outside investors use indirect ways to 




Chapter 5 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This dissertation visits several issues in disclosure and information that are related to reporting standards, 
governance, and corporate restructurings. First, the adoption of IFRS in the Canadian investment fund 
industry provides an ideal setting for the study of the how the new standards impact investment funds’ 
outcomes and fund managers’ behavior. From the results, I document that IFRS reduce fund manager’s 
discretion on assets appraisal and reported returns in financial statements. Moreover, the fact that many 
funds did voluntarily disclose cash flows before IFRS also show less return management. A practical 
implication of this study is that for countries not ready to mandate IFRS for investment funds can require 
the disclosure of cash flows first, as such single factor can also improve reporting quality of the investment 
funds. NAV discount is also impacted by IFRS as Level 2 securities contribute to more NAV discount 
under IFRS. While this study is the first archival work linking IFRS and closed-end fund because of the 
Canadian context, a few cautions remain for the following reasons. The Canadian fund industry is relatively 
small as only 231 closed-end funds are actively traded on the TSX. After excluding funds that were just 
recently formed and funds that have restructured, the sample size is reduced to 183. However, the industry 
of closed-end fund is not large in any country. The US market has less than 600 closed-end funds, and prior 
studies are able to construct samples ranging from 300 to 500 closed-end funds. However, the investment 
funds in other jurisdictions also have the option to voluntarily disclose cash flows. Therefore, before 
bringing Canadian experience to a more general conclusion, it is necessary to examine if the disclosure of 
cash flows has the same positive effect in other countries. 
Second, although the aim of adding outside directors to the boards is to strengthen governance and reduce 
opportunistic behaviors of managers, directors themselves are also subject to opportunistic behavior for 
individual benefits. The second essay provides evidence that current governance policies have not paid 
enough attention to outside directors’ behaviors. Regulations may have certain requirements on the 
presence, numbers, and expertise of outside directors, but the consequences are not as effective as 
lawmakers expect. Investors and regulators should be alerted when outside directors quit a firm while 
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remaining the positions in other firms, as such behavior is a signal of directors shirking their responsibilities 
of firms with potential troubles according to the evidence of this paper. On the other hand, before 
regulations effectively limit directors opportunistic choices, investors can take short positions to manage 
potential risk. According to this study, the risk is associated with directors not giving concrete or definite 
reasons for their departure. This urges regulators to require more details to disclose the reasons for directors’ 
departures and list other positions that a director is not leaving. When investors learn that a director is 
leaving firm A but staying in firm B and C, they are more likely to be concerned because this decision looks 
more firm-specific than being personal. 
Third, during corporate restructurings like mergers and acquisitions, public disclosure is limited after the 
offer is tendered until the offer is closed. During this period, a bidder directly contacts shareholders so that 
shareholders with larger ownership have more private information than smaller shareholders about the 
potential outcome of the acquisitions. While current public disclosure requirements do not mandate 
shareholders to release their decisions, small and outside investors are more uncertain about the outcome 
of acquisition offers. The third essay of this thesis shows that under the current limitation of public 
disclosure, investors can infer private information from abnormal returns around offer announcement. This 
paper also contributes to filling the gap in the literature since Luo (2005), who documents that insiders learn 
from outsiders by observing stock returns during M&A announcement, by looking form a reverse angle 
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Linear programming for identifying the fair value level of securities 
Below is the fair value hierarchy of Macquarie Emerging Markets Infrastructure Income Fund in its 2015 
annual report.  
Table 9 
Assets at fair value as at December 31, 2015  Level 1   Level 2   Level 3   Total 
Equities      $ 18,242,189  $ 1,625,403  $ –   $ 19,867,592 
Foreign currency forward contracts       –   47,299      –   47,299 
Total      $ 18,242,189  $ 1,672,702  $ –   $ 19,914,891 
According this schedule in Table 9, the fund holds a total of $1,625,403 securities measured at Level 2 Fair 
Value. However, in the Statement of Investment Portfolio which lists 25 securities held by the fund, no 
details is given to investors to know which securities are measured at Level 2. To identify each securities 
that are measured at Level 2, this paper employs linear programming for solution. 
Objective:   𝐹𝑉1 ∗ 𝑥1 + 𝐹𝑉2 ∗ 𝑥2 + ⋯ 𝐹𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝐹𝑉25 ∗ 𝑥25 = 1,625,403 
Subject to:  x𝑖 = binary (0, 1) 
By reaching the solution that x5 = 1 and x24 = 1, securities in line 5 and line 24 are identified as Level 2 
securities.  
𝐹𝑉5 + 𝐹𝑉24 = 843,784 + 781,619 = 1,625,403 
Therefore, the cost of Level 2 securities is the sum of cost of securities in line 5 and line 24 from Table 2, 
the Statement of Investment Portfolio. 
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As at December 31, 2015 
No. of Shares/Units      Average Cost ($)   Fair Value ($) 
Australia 
26,025  APA Group      216,146    228,301 
Bermuda 
719,560  COSCO Pacific Ltd.     1,061,897   1,101,408 
1,006,000 Yuexiu Transport Infrastructure Ltd.    722,221    876,310 
92,000  China Resources Gas Group Ltd.    279,052    381,735 
Brazil 
252,963  Prumo Logistica SA     827,997    843,784 
180,800  CCR SA       1,178,338   796,697 
179,100  EDP - Energias do Brasil SA     898,590    757,134 
198,800  Arteris SA      1,032,497   673,588 
Canada 
25,101  Veresen Inc.      306,899    222,398 
Chile 
677,280  Inversiones Aguas Metropolitanas SA    1,196,302   1,326,827 
294,552  Empresa Nacional de Electricidad SA/Chile   479,113    507,330 
China 
2,200,500 Qinhuangdao Port Co. Ltd.     1,421,084   1,443,530 
1,127,000 China Longyuan Power Group Corp.    1,443,861   1,181,689 
2,234,000  Huadian Fuxin Energy Corp. Ltd.    1,180,788   888,914 
908,000  Datang International Power Generation Co Ltd.   648,464    384,080 
Mexico 
585,000  OHL Mexico SAB de CV     1,273,556   848,799 
Poland 
185,686  Energa SA      1,158,811   825,617 
Singapore 
2,228,800 Hutchison Port Holdings Trust     1,735,267   1,640,895 
Spain 
16,671  Abertis Infraestructuras SA     348,185    362,501 
Thailand 
1,985,100 BTS Rail Mass Transit Growth Infrastructure Fund   668,312    781,619 
United States 
1,600  Sempra Energy      192,168    208,943 




Definition of Variables 
1.  Variables in Chapter 2 
Vol_Cash: voluntary disclosure of cash flows before IFRS. This variable equals to 1 if a fund did report 
cash flows in annual financial statement, and otherwise 0;   
IFRS: post-IFRS indicator. This variable equals to 1 if the year of observation is after the pertaining fund’s 
financial report is prepared after the adoption of IFRS. For funds with fiscal years ending with December 
31, this variable is 1 for the years on and after 2014. For fund with fiscal years ending before December 31, 
this variable is 1 for the years on and after 2015.  
Discount: NAV discount is calculated by subtracting NAV from the closing price of a fund at the date of 
fiscal-year end. If the fiscal-year end is not a trading day, the latest day before fiscal-year end is used.  
L1_Gain: unrealized gain or loss in Level 1 securities; 
L2_Gain: unrealized gain or loss in Level 2 securities; 
L3_Gain: unrealized gain or loss in Level 3 securities; 
Liqd_Gain: unrealized gain or loss in liquid securities, identical to Level 1 securities; 
Illqd_Gain: unrealized gain or loss in illiquid securities, equals to the aggregated gain in Level 2 and Level 
3 securities; 
L1_Ret: book return in Level 1 securities, computed by the fair-value change rate of the same portfolio of 
Level 1 securities, excluding items sold and acquired during year t; 
L2_Ret: book return in Level 2 securities, computed by the fair-value change rate of the same portfolio of 
Level 2 securities, excluding items sold and acquired during year t; 
L3_Ret: book return in Level 3 securities, computed by the fair-value change rate of the same portfolio of 
Level 3 securities, excluding items sold and acquired during year t; 
Liqd_Ret: book return in liquid securities, computed by the fair-value change rate of the same portfolio of 
Level 1 securities, excluding items sold and acquired during year t, identical to Level 1 securities; 
Illqd_Ret: book return in illiquid securities, computed by the fair-value change rate of the same portfolio of 
Level 2 and Level 3 securities, excluding items sold and acquired during year t; 
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2. Variables in Chapter 3 
NI: the net income of a firm; 
IndustryNI: the average net income of the industry where a firm is; 
Leave: indicating if a director announces the decision of departure; 
Type: being assigned to be 1 when a director retires, 2 when a director steps down, and 3 when a  director 
resigns;  
Hide: indicating if the reason for a director’s departure is concealed; 
Disagree: indicating if a disagreement with management or other kind of trouble is cited by the director; 
AT: the total assets of a firm; 
LT: the total liabilities of a firm; 
CAR: the cumulative abnormal return in a given window around the announcement of tender offer; 
Return: the abnormal return of a firm in a given month. 
3. Variables in Chapter 4 
Pre_Anc_CAR: pre-announcement cumulative abnormal return of a firm; 
Pre_Exp_CAR: pre-expiration cumulative abnormal return of a firms; 
Cash_Offer: equals to 1 if the tender offer uses cash as payment method; and 0 otherwise; 
Friendly: equals to 1 if the deal is endorsed by the board; and 0 otherwise; 
LnSize: logarithmic size of the target firm; 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A – Canadian closed-end funds from 2012 through 2016 fiscal years 
Variable Mean Median N Std Dev Maximum Minimum 
vol_Cash 0.7527 1.0000 930 0.4317 1 0 
IFRS 0.6000 1.0000 1155 0.4901 1 0 
L1_Gain 0.2164 0.1055 596 1.5162 43.5896 -0.9994 
L2_ Gain 0.2782 0.0168 283 2.6449 29.2335 -14.6544 
L3_ Gain 3.8894 0.0000 65 11.1918 68.9511 -1.1398 
NAV_disc 0.0267 0.0341 657 0.3089 -3.8333 0.9623 
Liqd_ret 0.2164 0.1055 596 1. 5162 43.5896 -0.9994 
Illq_ret 0.7212 0.0231 295 3.8849 29.5558 -14.6544 
 
Panel B – Canadian closed-end funds from 2012 through 2013 fiscal years (Pre-IFRS) 
Variable Mean Median N Std Dev Maximum Minimum 
vol_Cash 0.7527 1.0000 372 0.4320 1 0 
IFRS 0.0000 0.0000 462 0.0000 0 0 
L1_ Gain 0.1101 0.0991 249 0.2599 1.5169 -0.8961 
L2_ Gain 0.3377 0.0101 139 3.3380 29.2335 -14.6544 
L3_ Gain 3.2587 0.0059 29 13.6643 68.9511 -1.1398 
NAV_disc 0.0183 0.0316 327 0.2890 -3.0303 0.9114 
Liqd_ret 0.1105 0.1015 248 0.2603 1.5169 -0.8961 
Illq_ret 1.0106 0.0170 140 7.0827 69.7486 -14.6544 
 
Panel C- Canadian closed-end funds from 2014 through 2016. fiscal years (Post-IFRS) 
Variable Mean Median N Std Dev Maximum Minimum 
vol_Cash 0.7527 1 558 0.4318 1 0 
IFRS 1.0000 1.0000 693 0.0000 1 1 
L1_ Gain 0.2891 0.1086 350 2.4229 43.5896 -0.9994 
L2_ Gain 0.2208 0.0218 144 1.7426 16.8883 -4.2049 
L3_ Gain 4.3975 0.0000 36 8.8923 29.5558 -0.7439 
NAV_disc 0.0350 0.0369 330 0.3277 -3.8333 0.9623 
Liqd_ret 0.2927 0.1086 347 2.4324 43.5896 -0.9994 





Table 2 Correlations 
  vol_Cash IFRS L1_ Gain L2_ Gain L3_ Gain NAV_disc Liqd_ret Illq_ret 
vol_Cash 1 0 0.02488 0.00552 0.04543 0.04796 0.025 0.02149 
 1 0.5499 0.9268 0.7109 0.221 0.5482 0.7141 
930 930 580 279 69 653 579 293 
IFRS 0 1 0.04746 0.06956 0.11047 -0.02702 0.04728 0.08127 
1  0.2462 0.2401 0.3662 0.4894 0.2483 0.1596 
930 1155 599 287 69 657 598 301 
L1_ Gain 0.02488 0.04746 1 -0.02978 0.10272 -0.05093 1 -0.0296 
0.5499 0.2462  0.6755 0.4642 0.2566 <.0001 0.672 
580 599 599 200 67 498 598 207 
L2_ Gain 0.00552 0.06956 -0.02978 1 -0.0225 0.00187 -0.02982 0.45177 
0.9268 0.2401 0.6755  0.8875 0.977 0.6759 <.0001 
279 287 200 287 66 241 199 275 
L3_ Gain 0.04543 0.11047 0.10272 -0.0225 1 0.18799 0.10272 0.99998 
0.7109 0.3662 0.4642 0.8875  0.1614 0.4642 <.0001 
69 69 67 66 69 67 63 65 
NAV_disc 0.04796 -0.02702 -0.05093 0.00187 0.18799 1 -0.06616 0.00735 
0.221 0.4894 0.2566 0.977 0.1614  0.1408 0.9085 
653 657 498 241 67 657 497 247 
Liqd_ret 0.025 0.04728 1 -0.02982 0.10272 -0.06616 1 -0.02964 
0.5482 0.2483 <.0001 0.6759 0.4642 0.1408  0.6723 
579 598 598 199 63 497 598 206 
Illq_ret 0.02149 0.08127 -0.0296 0.45177 0.99998 0.00735 -0.02964 1 
0.7141 0.1596 0.672 <.0001 <.0001 0.9085 0.6723  





Table 3 Panel A 
H1: Illq_Gain=Liqd_Gain+ Vol_Cash + IFRS + Vol_Cash*IFRS + Liqd_ Gain*Vol_Cash + Gain_Appr *IFRS + Liqd_ Gain*Vol_Cash*IFRS 
Variable Parameter std t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept  0.2681 0.1746 1.54 0.1266 
Liqd_ Gain  1.7904*** 0.4705 3.81 0.0002 
vol_Cash -0.3548* 0.1966 -1.80 0.0730 
IFRS  0.1646 0.2742 0.60 0.5492 
Vol_Cash*IFRS  0.0290 0.3020 0.10 0.9237 
Liqd_Gain*Vol_Cash -1.7894*** 0.5368 -3.33 0.0011 
Liqd_Gain*IFRS  1.0754 0.8526 1.26 0.2090 
Liqd_Gain*Vol_Cash*IFRS -1.8556** 0.8951 -2.07 0.0398 
N 169    
F 7.95  Pr>F <0.0001 
R 0.4438  Ajusted R 0.4196 
 
Table 3 Panel B 
H1: Illq_ ret=Liqd_ret + Vol_Cash + IFRS + Vol_Cash*IFRS + Liqd_ret *Vol_Cash + Liqd_ret *IFRS + Liqd_ret *Vol_Cash*IFRS 
Variable Parameter std t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -1.5594*** 0.5350 -2.91 0.0040 
Liqd_ret  0.1195 0.6037 0.20 0.8433 
vol_Cash  1.0197 0.6186 1.65 0.1009 
IFRS  1.6722** 0.6452 2.59 0.0103 
Vol_Cash*IFRS -1.2923* 0.7454 -1.73 0.0845 
Liqd_ret*Vol_Cash  0.6611 0.6220 1.06 0.2891 
Liqd_ret*IFRS  0.8607 0.6768 1.27 0.2050 
Liqd_ret*Vol_Cash*IFRS -1.8351** 0.7326 -2.51 0.0131 
N 223.0000    
F 7.0600  Pr>F <0.0001 




Table 4 Panel A 
H2a: Gain_Mngmt (Level 2) = Incentive + Vol_Cash + IFRS + Vol_Cash* IFRS + Incentive*Vol_Cash + Incentive*IFRS + Incentive*Vol_Cash*IFRS, 
where Incentive is relative performance compared with year t-1 measured at appreciation rate. 
Variable Parameter Stderr t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.5816* 0.31747 -1.83 0.0697 
Incentive  5.5896*** 1.60278 3.49 0.0007 
vol_Cash  0.5205 0.35403 1.47 0.1444 
IFRS  0.4636 0.43846 1.06 0.2927 
vol_Cash*IFRS -0.3437 0.48211 -0.71 0.4774 
Incentive*Vol_Cash -5.5077*** 1.64083 -3.36 0.0011 
Incentive*IFRS -3.2846* 1.81299 -1.81 0.0729 
Incentive*Vol_Cash*IFRS  2.4845 1.92525 1.29 0.1997 
N 114    
F 3.26  Pr>F 0.0035 
R 0.1773   Ajusted R 0.1229 
 
Table 4 Panel B 
H2a: Ret_Mngmt (Level 2) = Incentive + Vol_Cash + IFRS + Vol_Cash* IFRS + Incentive*Vol_Cash + Incentive*IFRS + Incentive*Vol_Cash*IFRS,  
where Incentive is relative performance compared with industry average performance measured at book return. 
Variable Parameter Stderr t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.5735 0.31201 -1.84 0.068 
Incentive  0.7969*** 0.29596 2.69 0.0079 
vol_Cash  0.7844** 0.36277 2.16 0.0322 
IFRS  0.5781 0.38164 1.51 0.1319 
vol_Cash*IFRS -0.7876* 0.44031 -1.79 0.0756 
Incentive*Vol_Cash -0.5937 0.78139 -0.76 0.4485 
Incentive*IFRS -0.2148 0.34284 -0.63 0.5318 
Incentive**Vol_Cash*IFRS  0.2708 0.90467 0.3 0.7651 
N 158    
F 2.25  Pr>F 0.0528 





H2b: L2_Gain = L1_Gain + Vol_Cash + IFRS + Vol_Cash* IFRS + L1_Gain *Vol_Cash+ L1_Gain *IFRS + L1_Gain *Vol_Cash*IFRS 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept  0.0219 0.13865 0.16 0.8746 
L1_Gain  1.5245*** 0.40288 3.78 0.0002 
vol_Cash -0.0747 0.15762 -0.47 0.6359 
IFRS  0.0802 0.20392 0.39 0.6943 
Vol_Cash*IFRS  0.1166 0.22947 0.51 0.6117 
L1_Gain *Vol_Cash  1.1964* 0.71949 1.66 0.0981 
L1_Gain *IFRS -1.4985*** 0.45954 -3.26 0.0013 
L1_Gain *Vol_Cash*IFRS -1.9931*** 0.75636 -2.64 0.0091 
N 190    
F 21.17  Pr>F <0.0001 
R 0.4488   adjusted R 0.4276 
 
Table 6 
H2c: L3_Gain  = L1_Gain + L2_Gain + Vol_Cash + IFRS +  L2_ Gain *Vol_Cash + L2_ Gain *IFRS + L2_ Gain *Vol_Cash*IFRS 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept  1.5439*** 0.44734 3.45 0.0019 
L1_ Gain -0.2942 0.91169 -0.32 0.7495 
L2_ Gain  0.0039 0.93734 0 0.9967 
vol_Cash -1.9315*** 0.47688 -4.05 0.0004 
IFRS  0.1745 0.43297 0.4 0.6901 
L2_Gain*vol_cash  0.9559 1.51219 0.63 0.5328 
L2_Gain*IFRS  1.3131 1.10957 1.18 0.2473 
L2_Gain*vol_cash*IFRS -1.6396 1.95113 -0.84 0.4084 
N 64    
F 10.2799  Pr>F 0.0021 




H3: NAV_Discount  = L1_Gain + L2_Gain + L3_Gain + Vol_Cash + IFRS + L2_Gain*Vol_Cash+ L2_Gain*IFRS 
 + L2_ Gain *Vol_Cash*IFRS 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept  0.1059 0.0393 2.69 0.0127 
L1_Gain  0.0204 0.0663 0.31 0.7613 
L2_Gain -0.0737 0.0681 -1.08 0.2898 
L3_Gain -0.0201 0.0142 -1.41 0.1704 
vol_Cash -0.0463 0.0444 -1.04 0.3069 
IFRS -0.0200 0.0323 -0.62 0.5423 
L2_Gain *Vol_Cash -0.3691*** 0.1107 -3.34 0.0028 
L2_Gain *IFRS  0.0648 0.0827 0.78 0.4412 
L2_Gain *Vol_Cash*IFRS  0.5984*** 0.1437 4.17 0.0003 
N 64.0000    
F 5.1300  Pr>F 0.0008 







WFB stock quotes / timeline and turnover of outside directors 
 
  3/18 ret 3/18 ret  3/21 ret   3/15 ret   3/14 ret     1/31 res    3/16 ret 
  7/23 res 7/31 res  *      3/14 ret     
  
*  Howard I. Atkins resigned as CFO on February 8, 2011 and retired on August 6, 2011. 
Mark C. Oman retired as Senior Executive VP on December 1, 2011. 
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±30 days abnormal return around director’s notification of leave 




























±30 days abnormal return around director’s notification of leave 



































6 months before and 24 months after the notification of leave 




6 months before and 24 months after the notification of leave 



























Table 8 Panel A   
Description of outside directors’ leave and details 
  retire step down resign total 
age 29 4 1 34 
personal 9 14 48 71 
hidden 50 35 32 117 
disagree 0 4 6 10 
Total 88 57 86 231 
 
Table 9 Panel B 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Maximum Minimum 
NI 855 1965.01 715 3769.6 17798 -12650 
AT 855 104302.2 17983.51 316669.4 2264909 1311.84 
LT 855 86724.79 11639 285739.9 2036661 254.873 
CAR(-10,+1) 855 0.009172 0.003531 0.071153 0.417973 -0.23226 
CAR(-1,+10) 855 0.016213 0.01244 0.060883 0.251406 -0.22557 
CAR(-30,+1) 855 0.027742 0.016999 0.104242 0.391942 -0.26771 




Correlation of Variables 
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±30 days abnormal return around director’s notification of leave 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR 1.52% 0.63% 0.85% 0.55% 1.72% 2.06% 
patell Z 3.006** 2.160* 2.397** 1.452 2.743** 3.054** 




±30 days abnormal return around director’s notification of leave 
subsamples by type of leave 
Panel A: Retire 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR 2.79% 1.18% 0.67% -0.30% 0.49% 1.38% 
patell Z 2.819** 1.388 1.163 -0.251 0.703 1.297 
Sign Z 2.131* -0.315 3.020** -0.537 0.797 1.019 
Panel B: Step down 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR 2.32% 2.15% 0.99% 0.74% 2.35% 1.64% 
patell Z 2.469** 3.064** 2.101* 1.237 2.599** 1.138 
Sign Z 1.995* 3.116*** 0.874 1.435 1.995* 1.155 
Panel C: Resign 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR -0.12% -0.77% 0.93% 1.15% 2.45% 2.96% 
patell Z 0.175 -0.207 1.045 1.454 1.588 2.713** 





±30 days abnormal return around director’s notification of leave 
subsamples by reason of leave 
Panel A: Age 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR 4.00% 1.22% 0.65% 0.68% 2.84% 4.44% 
patell Z 2.417** 1.355 1.672* 1.199 2.769** 3.171*** 
Sign Z 1.288 0.591 1.636 0.939 2.680** 2.680** 
Panel B: Personal 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR 1.51% 1.41% 0.55% 0.52% 1.30% 3.71% 
patell Z 0.796 0.861 0.32 0.782 0.722 2.261* 
Sign Z 1.124 -0.107 -0.846 0.631 1.124 3.094*** 
Panel C: Hidden 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR 1.04% 0.57% 1.38% 0.64% 1.90% 0.63% 
patell Z 2.494** 2.228* 2.510** 0.999 1.896* 0.818 
Sign Z 2.044* 1.653* 3.411*** 1.067 1.848* 0.286 
Panel D: Disagreement or other trouble 
Window (-30,0) (-15,0) (-5,0) (0,+5) (0,+15) (0,+30) 
CAR -0.82% -5.46% -2.55% -1.93% -2.32% -2.45% 
patell Z -0.442 -1.700* -1.014 -1.273 -0.672 -0.249 
Sign Z 0.503 -1.500 -1.500 -0.165 -0.833 -1.500 
 
Table 14  
6 months before and 24 months after the notification of leave 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR -2.74% 1.50% 0.70% 0.64% 0.04% -3.41% 
patell Z -2.495** 0.501 0.369 0.727 0.326 -0.748 




6 months before and 24 months after the notification of leave 
subsamples by type of leave 
Panel A: Retire 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR -2.57% -0.88% -0.32% -0.53% -2.03% -1.51% 
patell Z -1.555 -0.802 -0.169 0.216 -0.07 0.227 
Sign Z -1.423 0.498 -0.783 0.498 1.352 0.712 
Panel B: Step down 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR -0.61% -0.92% 0.90% 2.47% 1.30% 0.80% 
patell Z -0.497 -0.259 0.297 0.748 0.099 -0.282 
Sign Z -2.024* -1.229 0.361 0.89 0.625 1.155 
Panel C: Resign 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR -4.23% 5.92% 1.46% 0.46% 0.98% -7.78% 
patell Z -2.047* 2.016* 0.474 0.339 0.502 -1.091 






6 months before and 24 months after the notification of leave 
subsamples by reason of leave 
Panel A: Age 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR -7.44% -2.63% 1.99% 3.35% 1.86% 8.30% 
patell Z -1.749* -0.979 0.501 1.024 0.274 1.046 
Sign Z -1.591$ 0.467 0.124 0.467 1.153 1.839* 
Panel B: Personal 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR -4.28% -3.13% -1.20% -0.33% -0.90% 0.58% 
patell Z -1.543 -1.351 -0.625 0.106 0.053 0.229 
Sign Z -1.927* -1.927* -0.73 -0.251 0.706 1.425 
Panel C: Hidden 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR 0.37% 6.32% 2.07% 1.08% 0.36% -8.47% 
patell Z -0.652 2.834** 1.099 0.653 0.356 -1.606 
Sign Z -0.247 1.605 1.420 2.160* 2.531** 0.123 
Panel D: Disagreement or other trouble 
Window (-6,0) (-3,0) (0,+3) (0,+6) (0,+12) (0,+24) 
CAR -11.60% -5.11% -7.82% -8.27% -6.16% -8.67% 
patell Z -2.264* -1.393 -1.428 -0.98 -0.364 -0.404 





Table 17  
Annual net income before and after outside director’s departure 
 
𝑁𝐼𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑁 + 𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑒 
NI year t year t+1 year t+1 
Intercept -0.5147*** 0.2210*** 1.3217*** 
(-3.79) (5.68) (6.05) 
Assets 0.4908*** 0.0891 0.0953 
(10.27) (0.42) (1.08) 
Liabilities -0.3373*** -0.0599 -0.0311 
(-8.66) (-0.85) (-1.38) 
IndustryNI 0.1169*** -0.0212 -0.0302 
(8.54) (-1.49) (-1.55) 
NI(t-1) 0.7523*** 0.2104***  
(46.59) (-3.95) 
NI(t)  0.7078*** 0.8569*** 
(15.20) (29.11) 
CAR -0.6306*** 0.0978 -0.0006 
(-3.9) (0.40) (-0.01) 
Type 0.0282 -0.1403* -0.0823** 
(1.30) (-4.06) (-2.46)  
Hide 0.1219* -0.4176*** -0.4085*** 
(1.68) (-3.45) (-3.38) 
Type*Hide -0.1396*** 0.2210*** 0.2053*** 
 (-4.15) (4.11) (3.85) 
F-value 933.91 324.14 359.26 
R-square 0.8573 0.7808 0. 7726 





Director’s leave and market timing opportunity (logistic regression) 
Pr(leave=1) 
assumption on notification time flexibility 
±1 month ±2 months ±3 months 
Intercept 0.13 1.21*** 1.65*** 
(0.85) (100.98) (209.21) 
Return (t-1) -1.94 -2.66 -1.05 
(0.78) (2.23) (0.39) 
Return (t) 0.86 2.27 1.99 
(0.17) (1.60) (1.40) 
Return (t+1) -6.84** -4.59** -4.29** 
(4.82) (6.25) (6.17) 
Return (t+2) 12.99*** 6.26*** 4.86** 
(12.86) (6.74) (4.94) 
Return (t+3) -3.54 2.22 1.50 
(1.07) (0.89) (0.52) 
Hide*Return (t-1) 3.45 5.05* 2.41 
(0.83) (3.40) (0.92) 
Hide*Return (t) -3.38 -4.73** -4.22** 
(1.63) (4.48) (4.55) 
Hide*Return (t+1) 11.22*** 6.58** 5.36** 
(7.85) (5.20) (4.01) 
Hide*Return (t+2) -10.04** -1.94 -1.34 
(4.55) (0.36) (0.20) 
Hide*Return (t+3) 0.71 -4.29 -2.68 
(0.02) (1.94) (0.90) 




Figure 11. Pre-Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Return of Targets 
 
Table 19. Pre-Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Return of Targets 
Window (-30,-2) (-25,-2) (-20,-2) (-15,-2) (-10,-2) 
CAR 10.79% 10.17% 8.58% 6.72% 4.78% 
t 56.73 55.52 50.56 46.36 33.75 
P>|t| <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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Table 20. Pre-Expiration Cumulative Abnormal Return of Targets 
Window (-15,0) (-10,0) (-5,0) 
CAR 1.86% 1.66% 0.70% 
t 12.31 13.04 5.42 
P>|t| <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
 
Table 21 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
Pre-Anc-CAR (-30,-2) 0.1079  0.0687  -0.6504  1.7553  0.2693  
Pre-Anc-CAR (-20,-2) 0.0858  0.0359  -0.5686  1.7929  0.2440  
Pre-Anc-CAR (-`0,-2) 0.0478  0.0182  -0.8834  2.2948  0.1992  
Pre-Exp-CAR (-15,0) 0.0186  0.0056  -0.5012  0.5548  0.1101  
Pre-Exp-CAR (-10,0) 0.0166  0.0051  -0.3418  0.6576  0.0933  
Pre-Exp-CAR (-5,0) 0.0070  0.0029  -0.4707  0.6470  0.0678  
Cash Offer 0.9068  1 0 1 0.2910  
Friendly 0.9250  1 0 1 0.2636  
LnSize 5.2037  5.1386  1.2173  9.1414  1.6334  





Table 22. OLS Regression for Pre-Expiration CAR (-15,0) 
Variable 
Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.0028 -0.0034 0.0027 
 (-0.10) (-0.12) (0.10) 
    
Pre-Anc_CAR 0.0394***   
(-30,-2) (2.23)   
    
Pre-Anc_CAR  0.0626***  
(-20,-2)  (3.26)  
    
Pre-Anc_CAR   0.0889*** 
(-10,-2)   (3.80) 
    
Cash Pay 0.0180 0.0173 0.0172 
 (1.09) (1.05) (1.05) 
    
Friendly 0.0248 0.0281 0.0236 
 (1.37) (1.43) (1.31) 
    
LnSize -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0037 
 (-1.02) (-1.11) (-1.30) 
    
Horizontal -0.0096 -0.0090 -0.0096 
 (-1.00) (-0.94) (-1.01) 
F value 2.54 3.68 4.45 





Figure 13. Comparing Pre-Expiration CAR 
high vs. low insider information groups 
 
Table 23. Comparing Pre-Expiration CAR 
high vs. low insider information groups 
Window (-15,0) (-10,0) (-5,0) 
H-group 1.78%** 1.82%*** 0.48% 
L-group 0.87% 0.70% 0.23% 
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